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TOWARDS THE SECOND FOUNDING OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING 
DAWINDER S. SIDHU 
 In 1987, the Nation’s first attempt to standardize federal sen-
tencing came in the form of the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines.  Following United States v. Booker, however, the Guide-
lines project began bending, and today it is now all but broken, 
besieged by complexity, undue severity, and the very disparities 
that it was designed to limit.  This Article responds to this crisis 
by establishing the blueprint for an alternative federal sentencing 
model.  Under this proposal, sentencing determinations would be 
based on statutory grades and unweighted aggravating and miti-
gating factors.  This approach brings coherence to the purposes 
of punishment and, by deemphasizing quantitative determina-
tions, promises increased judicial discretion and greater oppor-
tunities for counsel to influence sentencing.  To demonstrate this 
system’s simplicity and workability, this Article applies the sys-
tem to actual federal cases. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sentencing is one of the most solemn and significant acts exercised by 
a sovereign, as it determines, on behalf of the constituent people, whether 
and how the liberty of another is to be restricted.1  A society of laws must 
                                                          
© 2018 Dawinder Sidhu. 
 Visiting Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.  My thanks to the U.S. District 
Judges, staff of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, current and former U.S. Probation Officers, and 
faculty at the Georgetown University Law Center, the New York University School of Law, the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and the University of Baltimore School of Law for help-
ful conversations; to Alan Heinz, Jennifer Kittleson, and Ernesto Longa for their helpful research 
support; and to the excellent staff of the Maryland Law Review, the flagship legal journal in my 
home state, for improving the quality and readability of this Article.  While I served as Special 
Assistant to the Chair (2016) and Supreme Court Fellow (2013–14) at the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission, this Article is written in my personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect the views 
of the Commission or any Commissioner.  Please forgive me for any errors.   
 1.  See Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 268, 275 (1977) 
(“The criminal justice system controls the largest power the government exercises over its citizens 
and is of central constitutional importance . . . .  [S]entencing involves a heavy responsibility and 
raises issues of difficulty . . . .”); Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 
HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1952).  “[P]enal law governs the strongest force that we permit offi-
cial agencies to bring to bear on individuals.  Its promise as an instrument of safety is matched 
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impose punishment: There must be some consequence if an individual steps 
beyond the bounds of the law,2 and human nature is such that individuals 
invariably will cross the line.3 
For most of American history, judges possessed almost unlimited dis-
cretion to determine sentences, provided only that their sentences fell within 
established (and generally wide) statutory limits.4  A byproduct of this gen-
erous discretion was sentencing disparities.5  Concerned that similarly situ-
ated offenders were not receiving similar sentences, Congress sought to in-
troduce some appreciable level of uniformity into federal sentencing.6  
These reform efforts culminated in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
(“SRA”),7 which created the United States Sentencing Commission 
(“Commission”) and charged this new agency with establishing sentencing 
                                                          
only by its power to destroy. . . .  Nowhere in the entire legal field is more at stake for the com-
munity or for the individual.”  Id.   
Federal judges, including the Chief Justice of the United States, have acknowledged the 
stakes and the onerous nature of sentencing.  See, e.g., CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
2016 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2016), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2016year-endreport.pdf (“If the trial results in 
conviction, the judge faces the somber task of sentencing.  Most district judges agree that sentenc-
ing is their most difficult duty.”); Mark W. Bennett, Hard Time: Reflections on Visiting Federal 
Inmates, 94 JUDICATURE 304, 304 (2011) (“I have always had a hard time with sentencings.  It is 
an awesome responsibility to take one’s liberty away.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Does Religion Have a 
Role in Criminal Sentencing?, 23 TOURO L. REV. 539, 539 (2007) (“Sentencing, that is to say 
punishment, is perhaps the most difficult task of a trial court judge.”). 
 2.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Casey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001).  (“It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with . . . a penalty 
or punishment for disobedience.  If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or 
commands which pretend to be laws, will in fact amount to nothing more than advice or recom-
mendation.”). 
 3.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 269 (James Madison) (George W. Casey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001) (“[W]hat is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human 
nature?  If men were angels, no government would be necessary.”). 
 4.  See Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984) (“It is now well established that 
a judge . . . is to be accorded very wide discretion in determining an appropriate sentence.”); Dor-
szynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (“[O]nce it is determined that a sentence is 
within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an 
end.”). 
 5.  See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221 
[hereinafter SRA Legislative History] (“[E]very day Federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide 
range of sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed un-
der similar circumstances.”); see id. (attributing these disparities to “unfettered discretion” and the 
absence of “statutory guidance”).  
 6.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005) (“Congress’ basic goal in passing 
the Sentencing [Reform] Act was to move the sentencing system in the direction of increased uni-
formity.”). 
 7.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559 (2012); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2008).   
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guidelines applicable to all federal judges.8  In 1987, the Commission 
promulgated the first United States Guidelines Manual.9 
Thirty years later, the Guidelines’ structure—not just individual guide-
line provisions—is breaking down.  Judges are increasingly departing from 
the Guidelines.10  As compliance with the Guidelines decreases, so too does 
the ability of the Guidelines to achieve its primary aim of curbing sentenc-
ing disparities.11  Moreover, the Guidelines are increasingly complex12 and 
severe.13  They reduce the sobering responsibility of sentencing to quantita-
tive calculations,14 and appellate review is effectively an exercise in check-
ing the district court’s math.15  The Guidelines also failed to coordinate the 
competing purposes of punishment,16 meaning specific guideline provisions 
are not springing forth from any coherent principled source.17  Given these 
fundamental issues, the solution lies not in incremental repairs to the Guide-
lines, but in its wholesale replacement.  If 1987 marked the first founding of 
federal criminal sentencing, a second founding is in order. 
This Article proposes a new approach to sentencing in the federal 
courts.  This guidelines system may be summarized as follows: 
 A judge will first identify the statutory grade of the offense of 
conviction, as the statutory grade captures the relative seriousness 
of the offense.  Each grade has a corresponding sentencing range, 
established by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3559; a judge next will 
identify any statutory minimums or maximums that apply to the 
offense of conviction.  These offense-specific statutory mini-
mums and/or statutory maximums shall adjust the sentencing 
range otherwise set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3559; 
 The starting point for a sentence shall be the midpoint of the 
applicable statutory range (i.e., the sentencing range governing 
the grade of the offense of conviction, adjusted by any offense-
specific statutory minimums and/or statutory maximums); 
                                                          
 8.  28 U.S.C. § 994 (2008). 
 9.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987) [hereinafter 
1987 U.S.S.G.].  Please note that the Author will refer to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
generally as “the Guidelines,” and will refer to specific Guidelines from different years as “[year] 
U.S.S.G.” 
 10.  See infra Part III.E. 
 11.  28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (“The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission 
are to . . . avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct . . . .”). 
 12.  See infra Part III.B. 
 13.  See infra Part III.D. 
 14.  See infra Part III.C. 
 15.  See infra Part III.F. 
 16.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
 17.  See infra Part III.A. 
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 A judge shall impose, for typical cases, a sentence within 25% 
of this midpoint; 
 Upward or downward adjustments will be made based on a 
closed universe of twenty enumerated aggravating and mitigating 
factors.  These factors are drawn from the text and legislative his-
tory of the SRA.  No fixed numerical scores will be assigned to 
these factors, allowing the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the 
judge to consider the applicability and qualitative weight of the 
factors; 
 All aggravating factors must be proven to a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt; 
 Meaningful appellate review will follow if a judge imposes a 
sentence outside of this range, employs a non-enumerated factor, 
or miscalculates the applicable range; 
 The form of punishment shall be based on evidence-based re-
habilitation.  As the sentence length is predicated on the relative 
seriousness of the offense, the length of punishment shall be justi-
fied on retributive considerations.  To incentivize participation in 
rehabilitative programming and reduce recidivism, an offender 
shall not be released until they are determined to be capable of 
living crime-free in society.  In this respect, parole will be re-
turned to the federal system.  Any continued sentence beyond 
what is supported by retributive considerations shall be justified 
on the need to incapacitate the offender.  Truth in sentencing will 
be furthered by knowledge that an offender will serve a certain, 
minimum length of time; 
 First-time offenders who do not commit a violent or otherwise 
serious offense will not be sentenced to a term of incarceration, 
and conversely, incarceration is most appropriate for offenders 
who commit violent or otherwise serious offenses; and 
 The Commission shall study the sentencing practices of judges 
and modify the applicable midpoint for offenses in light of this 
data.  The Commission also may modify the applicable midpoint 
based on broader efforts to give greater coherence to the federal 
criminal code. 
To demonstrate the workability of this system, this Article shows how 
the system would apply to a series of real federal cases. 
The Commission itself is debating structural changes to the Guidelines 
and, in doing so, has acknowledged the unsustainability of the status quo.  
This Article offers, in parallel to that agency’s structural reform efforts, an 
alternative federal sentencing regime.  The hope is that this system will be 
considered, side-by-side with the Commission’s eventual proposal, such 
that Congress and the greater sentencing community can have a deeper 
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source of ideas from which to draw.  These improved guidelines may be a 
meaningful part of broader criminal justice reform. 
I recognize that elements of the system described below may be con-
troversial and even non-starters for some.  But the movement in furtherance 
of a more sensible and simplified guidelines regime must begin with the 
presentation and consideration of different ideas. As Justice Stephen G. 
Breyer noted with respect to the preparation and publication of the first 
draft of the guidelines manual, the draft served as a “vehicle for people to 
comment” and members of the sentencing community invariably “would 
comment negatively.”18  The draft nonetheless was part of the process that 
ultimately led towards a final manual.  This Article is submitted to the sen-
tencing community in the same spirit, with the same objective. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II traces the development of 
federal sentencing, which culminated in the development of the Guidelines.  
Part III identifies critical problems with the Guidelines, including diminish-
ing compliance, which suggest that the present system cannot be salvaged.  
Part IV responds to this crisis by advancing a new federal sentencing sys-
tem, characterized by the aforementioned principles.  Part V acknowledges 
limitations of this system.  Part VI shows how the system would play out in 
practice. 
II.  THE FIRST FOUNDING 
This Part describes the pre-Guidelines concerns that led to calls for a 
federal sentencing agency and federal guidelines, how Congress responded 
to these demands for federal sentencing reform, and the basic aspects of the 
Guidelines system. 
A.  Pre-Guidelines Sentencing 
Historically, sentencing in the United States was an uncoordinated en-
terprise.  At the country’s inception, sentencing was driven by principles of 
deterrence, with retribution playing a role in only the most heinous of 
crimes.19  In the nineteenth century, rehabilitation emerged as the primary 
rationale for punishment,20 and the rehabilitative approach continued to 
                                                          
 18.  Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States Sen-
tencing Commission, 1985–1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1231 (2017) (quoting Interview by 
Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, Comm’r, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, at 14 (May 
12, 1987) (on file with authors)).  
 19.  See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789–1865, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 111, 111–13 
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
 20.  See id. at 116–17. 
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dominate American sentencing theory until modern times.21  In a rehabilita-
tion-centric sentencing system, judges possessed virtually unlimited discre-
tion to impose a sentence tailored to reform the particular offender.22 
Such individualized sentencing maximized judicial discretion, but 
came at the cost of sentencing disparities throughout the country and even 
within the same districts.23  The seminal 1974 Second Circuit Sentencing 
Study demonstrated this point.  In the study, federal judges within the Sec-
ond Circuit were asked to impose sentences in twenty hypothetical cases, 
with full discretion.24  “[T]he results diverged dramatically,” Justice Breyer 
recounted.25  In the first of twenty cases, for example, one judge would have 
imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment, while another a sentence 
of twenty years.26  These disparities confirmed that offenders with like 
backgrounds who committed like offenses were not being given like sen-
tences.27  The study helped bolster the case for federal sentencing reform.28 
In a series of speeches and writings, Judge Marvin Frankel, the “father 
of sentencing reform,”29 brought critical attention to sentencing dispari-
ties.30  He highlighted, for example, “compelling evidence that widely une-
qual sentences are imposed every day in great numbers for crimes and crim-
                                                          
 21.  See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (“Reformation and rehabilitation of 
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”). 
 22.  See, e.g., id. at 245 (stating that “New York judges are given a broad discretion to decide 
the type and extent of punishment for convicted defendants”). 
 23.  The term disparities, here, primarily means like offenders committing like offenses and 
receiving different sentences.  In addition, the term disparities also encompasses discriminatory 
sentencing practices.  See William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A 
Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 359–62 
(1991) (summarizing findings of studies on the forms and extent of racial discrimination in sen-
tencing); see also KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 60–61 (1998) (explaining sentences for white collar and 
drug offenses perceived to be too lenient). 
 24.  FED. JUD. CTR., THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES 
OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 1–3 (1974), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/2dcrstdy.pdf/$file/2dcrstdy.pdf [hereinafter SECOND 
CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY]. 
 25.  Justice Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 
180, 180 (1999). 
 26.  SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY, supra note 24, at 6–7 tbl.1. 
 27.  See id. 
 28.  See SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 41–44. 
 29.  128 CONG. REC. 26,503 (1982) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy). 
 30.  See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973) 
[hereinafter FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES]; Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing]; Jon O. Newman, A 
Better Way to Sentence Criminals, 63 A.B.A. J. 1562, 1563 (1977) (“Most of today’s criticisms 
hold that there is too much disparity in sentencing . . . .  I agree . . . that there is excessive dispari-
ty.”). 
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inals not essentially distinguishable from each other.”31  In response, Judge 
Frankel proposed a uniform federal sentencing system and a “National 
Commission” to develop and monitor that system.32 
B.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
In 1984, Congress ultimately responded to the call for greater sentenc-
ing uniformity by passing the SRA.33  The SRA set forth a number of gen-
eral rules on sentencing and created an independent agency within the fed-
eral judiciary, the United States Sentencing Commission,34 tasking it with 
translating the SRA’s many directives into specific sentencing policies that 
would be binding on all federal judges.35  While sentencing involves a 
number of policy choices, the dominant principle of the SRA was that like 
offenses committed by offenders with like criminal histories should receive 
like sentences.36 
The Guidelines project was the country’s first ever attempt to stand-
ardize federal sentencing policy.  The introduction of these Guidelines has 
been likened to a revolution in American criminal law and federal sentenc-
ing.37  For example, at the confirmation hearing for prospective Commis-
sioners, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee said the nominees 
would be taking on the “role of founders.”38 
                                                          
 31.  FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 30, at 8. 
 32.  Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, supra note 30, at 51.  
 33.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559 (2012).  For Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012).  The definitive overview of the legislative attempts to 
deal with sentencing disparities is Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: 
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 
(1993). 
 34.  See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (establishing the Commission). 
 35.  Id. § 991(b) (enumerating the purposes of the Commission); see also Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 369–70 (1989) (describing the responsibilities of the Commission). 
 36.  See SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 41 (decrying the “disparity in the sentences 
which courts impose on similarly situated defendants”); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal 
Sentencing Reform: Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 291, 295 (1993) (“The first and foremost goal of the sentencing reform effort was to allevi-
ate the perceived problem of federal criminal sentencing disparity.”). 
 37.  As one U.S. Circuit Judge noted, the Guidelines are “the greatest change in federal sen-
tencing since the founding of the republic.”  Hon. Edward R. Becker, Insuring Reliable Fact Find-
ing in Guidelines Sentencing: Must the Guarantees of the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses 
Be Applied?, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REMARKS OF THE HON. 
EDWIN MEESE III, ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SENTENCING COMMISSION’S 
GUIDELINES BEFORE THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 11 (1987) (“These guidelines mark a deci-
sive turning point in the history of the federal criminal justice system.”). 
 38.  Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearing on Michael K. Block, Ilene H. 
Nagel, and Paul H. Robinson Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 306 (1985) 
(statement of Sen. Charles Mathias). 
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In 1987, the Commission fulfilled its initial mandate, promulgating the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual.39  Since then, the Commis-
sion has, as required by statute, adjusted the Guidelines through an amend-
ment process that ends with Congress’s express approval or acquiescence.40  
The essential structure has remained the same: to find the appropriate sen-
tence, a judge calculates the offense conduct score (made up of a base of-
fense of conviction score and scores for aspects of the specific offense con-
duct), calculates an offender’s criminal history,41 and then finds the 
intersection of these inputs on a 258-box grid containing sentencing rang-
es.42 
In 2005, the Supreme Court held, in United States v. Booker,43 that a 
mandatory Guidelines system was unconstitutional.44  As the remedy, the 
Court rendered the Guidelines advisory.45  The Court has made clear that 
the Guidelines are still to be the “starting point and the initial benchmark” 
for a judge’s determination of a federal sentence.46  Because the Guidelines 
are the first step in the sentencing process, the Court repeatedly has 
acknowledged that a judge’s ultimate sentencing decision will be “an-
chored” to the initial Guidelines calculation.47  Though Guidelines compli-
ance waned after Booker,48 the Guidelines continue in an advisory world to 
occupy a “central role” in federal sentencing.49 
                                                          
 39.  1987 U.S.S.G., supra note 9.  
 40.  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2008) (describing the Guidelines amendment process). 
 41.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(7) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016) [hereinafter 2016 U.S.S.G.] (stating that the Guidelines range is the product of 
§§ 1B1.1(a)(1)–(5), which relate to the offender’s offense conduct, and § 1B1.1(a)(6), which re-
lates to the offender’s criminal history).  The Guidelines also provide for “departures” from the 
Guidelines, id. § 1B1.1(b), and for the purposes of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to be con-
sidered.  Id. § 1B1.1(c); see also Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2079 (2013) (noting that 
the Guidelines are “a system under which a set of inputs specific to a given case (the particular 
characteristics of the offense and offender) yielded a predetermined output (a range of months 
within which the defendant could be sentenced)”). 
 42.  For the Sentencing Table, see 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 5A. 
 43.  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 44.  Id. at 280. 
 45.  Id. at 245. 
 46.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).   
 47.  See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1349 (2016); Peugh v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013).  
 48.  See infra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.  
 49.  Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1341; see also United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 40 
(2d Cir. 2013) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“[T]he starting, guidelines-departure point matters [be-
cause when individuals] are given an initial numerical reference . . . they tend (perhaps unwitting-
ly) to ‘anchor’ their subsequent judgments . . . .”); United States v. Diaz-Ibarra, 522 F.3d 343, 347 
(4th Cir. 2008) (“An error in the calculation of the applicable Guidelines range . . . infects all that 
follows at the sentencing proceeding, including the ultimate sentence chosen by the district 
court . . . .”); Jed S. Rakoff, Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Should Be Scrapped, 26 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 6, 8 (2013) (“[As] the very first thing a judge is still required to do at sentencing is to 
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III.  THE CRISIS IN FEDERAL SENTENCING 
The Guidelines, however responsive to discomfort with sentencing 
disparities and however influential in current sentencing decisions, are 
breaking down.  Several problems with the Guidelines support this conclu-
sion: the Guidelines do not coordinate the principled reasons for punish-
ment and instead rely on averages as the foundation for penalty outcomes; 
the Guidelines are growing in complexity, undermining their comprehen-
sion and ease of administration; the Guidelines reduce sentencing to a math 
problem, diminishing the human and qualitative aspects of sentencing and 
enhancing the leverage of prosecutors by affording them a quantifiable 
baseline for plea negotiations; the Guidelines contribute to severe federal 
sentences, especially in the context of drug offenses and especially by 
equating quantity with culpability, which have particularly detrimental ef-
fects on the poor and people of color; the Guidelines have been met with 
decreased compliance, in part due to the fact that they were built to be man-
datory yet are operating in an advisory world, meaning the Guidelines are 
not adequately furthering their primary goal of curbing sentencing dispari-
ties; and the Guidelines do not promote meaningful appellate review. 
A.  The Guidelines Lack Philosophical Coherence 
Congress required the Commission to ensure that the Guidelines re-
flect the four purposes of punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation.50  The original Commission responded to this 
charge by deciding to develop two drafts—one based on retributive or “just 
deserts” considerations and a second based on utilitarian or “crime control” 
considerations—which would then be melded into a “multipurpose amal-
gam.”51  The “just deserts” draft was not well-received and a “crime con-
trol” draft was not developed at all.52  Running out of time to meet the statu-
tory deadline of April 13, 1987,53 the Commission pulled the plug on the 
multipurpose project.  Instead, the Commission adopted an “empirical” ap-
proach in which the past practices, or the average sentences in the pre-
Guidelines era, became the touchstone for the Guidelines.54  The Commis-
                                                          
calculate the Guidelines range, [the calculation] creates a kind of psychological presumption from 
which most judges are hesitant to deviate too far.”). 
 50.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012). 
 51.  See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 918–19 (1990). 
 52.  See id. at 918–20. 
 53.  See 1987 U.S.S.G., supra note 9, at 1.1. 
 54.  See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. l, 17 (1988). 
  Faced, on the one hand, with those who advocated “just deserts” but could not pro-
duce a convincing, objective way to rank criminal behavior in detail, and, on the other 
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sion presumed that the average sentences embodied judges’ varying views 
of the purposes of punishment.55  The Commission did not, however, clarify 
or explain how the purposes of punishment were to be effectuated in the 
Guidelines.  In other words, the Guidelines lack a principled basis, as the 
dissenting member of the original Commission and others have recog-
nized.56 
A recent development in federal sentencing underscores the disinterest 
in a philosophical basis for the Guidelines, and the importance of harmoniz-
ing the purposes of punishment.  In 2017, the Attorney General issued a 
memorandum, explaining the Department of Justice’s policy with respect to 
charging decisions.57  The Attorney General instructed his prosecutors to 
charge defendants with the “most serious, readily provable offense,” defin-
ing “serious” as the charge that carries the “most substantial . . . sentence.”58  
The memorandum triggered a flurry of criticism, but the public commentary 
completely overlooked the second piece of the memorandum: it also in-
structs prosecutors to ultimately “seek a reasonable sentence under the fac-
                                                          
hand, with those who advocated “deterrence” but had no convincing empirical data 
linking detailed and small variations in punishment to prevention of crime, the Com-
mission reached an important compromise.  It decided to base the Guidelines primarily 
upon typical, or average, actual past practice. 
Id.; see also Nagel, supra note 51, at 930–31.  Past practice was used as a guide for the Guide-
lines’ sentencing levels, except for drug and white-collar offenses; they were seen as too lenient 
and thus were enhanced under the Guidelines.  See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 23, at 60–61. 
 55.  See Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of Sen-
tencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,121, 18,122 
(May 13, 1987) [hereinafter Robinson Dissenting] (explaining that two judges may sentence for 
different reasons, “[b]ut by adopting no policy, and relying upon a mathematical average of sen-
tences, the guidelines provide ‘bastardized’ sentences that will serve neither of the two purpos-
es.”); see also INSLAW, INC. & YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, INC., FEDERAL SENTENCING: 
TOWARD A MORE EXPLICIT POLICY OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS III-2, III-4, III-5 to III-7 (1981) 
(providing a survey revealing judges’ differences of opinion as to sentencing goals); Edward M. 
Kennedy, Foreword to PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE 
SENTENCING SYSTEM vii, viii (1977) (“One judge may sentence in order to rehabilitate, another to 
deter the offender or the potential offender from committing a similar crime, a third to incapaci-
tate, while a fourth may sentence simply to ‘punish.’”). 
 56.  See Robinson Dissenting, supra note 55, at 18,123 (“Past practice cannot be properly or 
legally used, as the guidelines use it, as a ‘theory’ or ‘principle’ for guideline drafting.”); Jeffrey 
S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Criminal Sentencing Policy; or, Confessions 
of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001, 1012 (2001) (“While there is much to 
be said for the empirical approach of the initial guidelines, ultimately such an approach cannot 
substitute fully for the development of sound sentencing principles, if sentencing reform is to pro-
gress toward its ultimate goal of creating a measurably more effective system of criminal punish-
ment.”); see also Editorial, Rational Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1976, at A14 (“Any new 
sentencing program which does not address itself to those uncertainties is apt ultimately to lapse 
into confusion born of the absence of an intellectual core.”). 
 57.  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR ALL FEDERAL 
PROSECUTORS (May 10, 2017), http://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download. 
 58.  Id. at 1. 
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tors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.”59  The four purposes codified in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553 are the backstop for a prosecutor’s charging decisions under the 
memorandum and the touchstone of a federal judge’s sentencing determina-
tions.  But the purposes were not even addressed in the memorandum, let 
alone melded together in any coherent way. 
B.  The Guidelines Are Increasingly Complex 
The Guidelines are increasingly complex60 if not unworkable.61  Even 
the Supreme Court62 and some Commissioners63 have acknowledged the 
undue complexity of the Guidelines.  In 1996, the Commission itself at-
tempted to craft a “simplified” version of the Guidelines, effectively admit-
ting that the Guidelines are too complex.64  Twenty years later, in 2016, the 
Commission released its priorities for action, which included examining the 
“overall structure of the guidelines,” another concession that the Guidelines 
are too cumbersome.65  Literally, this is a growing problem: easy applica-
tion of the Manual becomes a more distant prospect as more material is 
added to it.66 
                                                          
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power 
Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 309 (2011) (noting the “undue complexity and rigidity of the 
guidelines system”); see also Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(“Sentencing guidelines provisions are many and complex . . . .”); United States v. Mills, 485 F.3d 
219, 223 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The Sentencing Guidelines are a veritable maze of interlocking sections 
and statutory cross-references.”); United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767, 773 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(Carnes, J., concurring) (referring to “the Sentencing Guidelines, some provisions of which are 
mind-numbingly complex and others of which are just mind-numbing”). 
 61.  See United States v. Spencer, 700 F.3d 317, 326 (8th Cir. 2012) (Bright, J., dissenting) 
(“[M]any of the federal sentencing guidelines have proven unworkable.”). 
 62.  See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1342 (2016) (“The Guidelines are 
complex . . . .”); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 346–47 (2004) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (characterizing certain Guidelines as “highly complex”).  This view of the Guidelines is 
quite weighty, if not ironic, as then-Judge Breyer was a member of the inaugural Sentencing 
Commission.  See Former Commissioner Information, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
http://www.ussc.gov/about/commissioners/former-commissioner-information (last visited Feb. 12, 
2018).   
 63.  See William H. Pryor, Jr., Returning to Marvin Frankel’s First Principles in Federal Sen-
tencing, 29 FED. SENT’G REP. 95 (Dec. 2016–Feb. 2017) [hereinafter Judge Pryor’s Remarks]; 
Remarks of Judge William Pryor at Scalia Law School, George Mason University, 29 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 278, 278 (June 2017) [hereinafter Judge Pryor’s Response] (“[W]e need simpler 
guidelines.” (emphasis omitted)); Sessions, supra note 60, at 342–43. 
 64.  See Simplification Draft Paper, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/working-group-
reports/simplification/simplification-draft-paper (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (acknowledging the 
complexity in the current Guidelines).  
 65.  Proposed Priorities for Amendment Cycle, 81 Fed. Reg. 37,241 (proposed June 9, 2016).  
 66.  See Judge Pryor’s Remarks, supra note 63, at 95–97 (noting the Guidelines have “grown 
in complexity” and observing the current manual is double the size of the original); R. Barry 
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C.  The Guidelines Are Unduly Quantitative 
The Guidelines have withdrawn judicial discretion in service of a cold 
point-system.  The solemn act of sentencing another human has been re-
duced, almost entirely, to arithmetic.67  Judge Frankel declared, “It is our 
duty to see that the force of the state, when it is brought to bear through the 
sentences of our courts, is exerted with the maximum we can muster of ra-
tional thought, humanity, and compassion.”68  The Guidelines’ reliance on 
numbers offers the appearance of that rationality.69  Other judges’ dissatis-
faction with the Guidelines’ reliance on numbers is exemplified by the 
phrase “grid and bear it.”70 
The sufficiency of math alone in sentencing is such that if a judge sen-
tences within the Guidelines range, they need not provide any explanation 
or utter a single clarifying word—to the defendant, to counsel, to the vic-
tims or their families, to the appeals court judges, or to the people on whose 
behalf a sentence is imposed—as to why they selected a particular sen-
tence.71  Because a within-Guidelines sentence is presumed to be reasona-
ble,72 a district judge need only allow the numbers to speak for themselves. 
                                                          
Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Psychological and Policy 
Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 764 (2001) (identifying 631 
amendments to the Guidelines, from 1987 through 2001, which evidence the Guidelines’ com-
plexity); see also Mark Osler, Death to These Guidelines, and a Clean Sheet of Paper, 21 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 7, 12 (2008) (“[T]hose Guidelines have become bloated and confusing . . . and have 
simply become more so as each branch of government has had its turn making things ever more 
complicated.”). 
 67.  As one former federal district court judge writes, “defendants confront a judge who far 
too often, just ‘does the math,’ situates the defendant on the grid, and sentences, no matter how 
anomalous or harsh the results.”  Nancy Gertner, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A View From 
the Bench, 29 HUM. RTS. 6, 8 (2002).  Another has suggested the process is “inhumane and robot-
ic.” Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-makes-the-case-for-
judgment/463380/ (characterizing the views of Hon. John Coughenour and adding that “Congress 
tried to convert [sentencing] into a science.  And it’s not a science.  It’s a human being dealing 
with other human beings.  And it shouldn’t be done by computers.”).  
 68.  FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 30, at 124. 
 69.  See Frank O. Bowman, III, Nothing Is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal 
Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 356, 356 (2012) (“[The Guidelines] subdivided the uni-
verse of possible sentences into 258 boxes, which critics said served largely to create a reassuring 
illusion of rationally calibrated allocations of punishment.”). 
 70.  See, e.g., United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (N.D. Iowa 2013). 
 71.  The sufficiency of silence in sentencing, insofar as the sentence imposed is within the 
Guidelines range, troubled several Justices.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Molina-
Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (No. 14-8913) (probing how a defendant could 
prove plain error where “the judge is within the Guidelines [and] he doesn’t have to say anything 
more about it”); id. at 41 (“If . . . the sentence is within the Guidelines, the judge doesn’t have to 
say anything at all.  So it’s very difficult for the defendant to go back and say, here’s what the er-
ror was even though there’s also a clear error, a plain error in what the original calculation was.”); 
id. at 36–37 (asking what may be done about “most Sentencing Guidelines cases, certainly in this 
case,” in which “the judge says nothing.  He’s told the probation office said these are the Guide-
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The numbers-based system also makes the Guidelines an effective tool 
for prosecutors.  That is, the probation officer, prosecutor, and defense 
counsel can do a Guidelines calculation in advance of sentencing and the 
resulting range serves as a good approximation of the ultimate sentence.  
Knowing the likely sentence in advance, the prosecutor can point to this 
baseline as a reliable starting point for plea negotiations, and thus, has sig-
nificant leverage in the plea negotiation process.73  To be sure, this relative 
certainty is seen as a positive attribute of the numbers-based Guidelines sys-
tem.74  A byproduct of this certainty, however, is the heightened bargaining 
position of the prosecutor.  The prosecutor’s advantaged power is reflected 
in the increasing and extremely high rate of guilty pleas: ninety-seven per-
cent of federal criminal cases are resolved by way of guilty pleas,75 whereas 
the corresponding number was eighty-seven percent in the first year of the 
Guidelines era.76  The rise in pleas is not coincidental; indeed, one federal 
district court judge asserted that “[e]nhanced [p]lea [b]argaining [i]s 
[a]ctually the [c]entral [g]oal of the Guidelines.”77  If the numbers-based 
                                                          
lines, and the judge says, okay. . . .  Doesn’t explain why.”); see also id. at 6 (addressing the situa-
tion, which “will—may very often be the case”—in which “the judge . . . imposes a sentence with-
in what the judge believes to be the Guideline range but says nothing whatsoever beyond that, and 
it turns out that that is not the correct Guidelines range, so that there’s no evidence one way or the 
other about what the judge would have done had the judge understood the correct Guidelines 
range”). 
 72.  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (upholding courts’ presumption that a 
sentence imposed within the Guidelines is reasonable).  
 73.  See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 23, at 145 (discussing the shift in power to prosecu-
tors due to the advance knowledge of a sentencing range). 
 74.  See Wes R. Porter, The Pendulum in Federal Sentencing Can Also Swing Toward Pre-
dictability: A Renewed Role for Binding Plea Agreements Post-Booker, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 469, 483 (2011) (“A defendant pleading guilty during the mandatory Guidelines era had a 
firm understanding about what lie ahead at sentencing.  The individual defendant valued the bene-
fits of predictability and informed decision making . . . .”). 
 75.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL YEAR 2015, 
SECOND CIRCUIT 3–5, tbl.2, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2015/2c15.pdf.  In the Fifth and 
Tenth Circuits, pleas accounted for 98.6% of criminal cases, thus only 1.4% of cases went to trial.  
Id. 
 76.  STITH & CABRANES, supra note 23, at 130; see also William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., Com-
peting Sentencing Policies in a “War on Drugs” Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 325 (1993) 
(“The nationwide plea-trial ratio has remained relatively constant before and after implementation 
of the guidelines, at about eighty-five percent of cases disposed of by guilty pleas.” (citing 
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 59 (1991)). 
 77.  United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 270 (D. Mass. 2004) (emphasis added) 
(“[G]uilty offenders hope against hope for some especial leniency and, when that hope is dashed 
by defense counsel explaining that the Guidelines foreclose such result . . . many will plead guilty 
to obtain the discount offered by the Department [of Justice] to induce a plea.”); see also United 
States v. Beserra, 967 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The framers of the sentencing guidelines 
were not, we take it, addressing the metaphysics of human responsibility.  No doubt they wanted 
to encourage the guilty to plead guilty . . . .”). 
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system aids judges who need only do the math and prosecutors who can in-
duce guilty pleas, it offers very little for the criminal defendant.78 
D.  The Guidelines Are Unduly Severe 
The Guidelines call for severe sentences.  Congress, through its en-
actment of mandatory minimum sentences, is most responsible for such se-
verity and mass incarceration in the federal system.79  But nonetheless, the 
Guidelines contribute to the overgrown federal prison population.80  As Jus-
tice Kennedy observed, “[O]ur punishments [are] too severe, our sentences 
[are] too long.  In the federal system the sentencing guidelines are responsi-
ble in part for the increase in prison terms.”81 
The severity of the Guidelines is perhaps most evident in the context 
of drug offenses.  Soon after Congress enacted the SRA, it also enacted the 
                                                          
 78.  A common refrain is that a criminal defendant does not end up in federal court unless 
they have done something truly “bad” and is, thus, not a terribly sympathetic figure.  Even assum-
ing that a federal criminal defendant is convicted of a highly blameworthy offense, this fact alone 
does not mean the defendant should be at a serious disadvantage in the sentencing phase or func-
tionally surrender his or her Sixth Amendment rights.  See infra Part IV.B.5 (discussing the Sixth 
Amendment rights of criminal defendants); infra n.313 (explaining the “trial penalty”). 
 79.  See Brent E. Newton, The Story of Federal Probation, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 311, 345 
n.152 (2016) (explaining the average sentence of a federal offender subject to a mandatory mini-
mum sentence is 139 months of imprisonment, whereas the average sentence of a federal offender 
not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence is 28 months); Sessions, supra note 60, at 331 
(“There are now over 170 provisions that bear mandatory minimum sentences.  Twenty-eight per-
cent of the federal criminal cases subject to the sentencing guidelines in 2009 involved statutes 
that carried mandatory minimums.  That figure increases to 40% of the docket if immigration cas-
es are excluded.” (citations omitted) (first citing to U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FY2009 DATASET 
(2009); then citing Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 
(2007) (statement of Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Commission); and then 
citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FY2009 DATASET (2009))).  The prison population is decreas-
ing relative to prior years.  See Jennifer Levitz, Prison Population in the U.S. Shrinks to Smallest 
in a Decade, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/prison-population-in-the-
u-s-shrinks-to-smallest-in-a-decade-1482987660.  But, over-incarceration remains problematic in 
absolute terms and relative to other countries.  See Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s 
Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 816–17 (2017). 
 80.  See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 23, at 59–65; Gerard E. Lynch, Letting Guidelines 
Be Guidelines (and Judges Be Judges), OSCJL AMICI: VIEWS FROM THE FIELD, 4 (Jan. 2008), 
jttp://osjclblogspot.com (“I suspect that a large number, perhaps a majority, of judges believe that 
the overall sentencing pattern of the guidelines is excessively severe.”); see also Marc L. Miller, 
Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1222–23 
(2004) (analyzing statistics suggesting that the Guidelines are too severe).  But see Paul G. Cas-
sell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal 
Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1020–43 (2004) (arguing that the Guidelines are 
“tough,” but not “too harsh,” and that the Guidelines as a whole need not be reduced downwards).  
 81.  Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Speech at the 
American Bar Association Annual Meeting, (Aug. 9, 2003), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_08-09-03 [hereinafter Justice 
Kennedy’s Speech]. 
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Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which set mandatory minimum penalties for drug of-
fenses.82  The Commission interpreted these statutory penalties as congres-
sional directives to impose stringent guideline penalties for drug offenses.83  
Controversially, the Commission extrapolated from the mandatory mini-
mums in establishing the drug guidelines.  United States Circuit Judge Jon 
O. Newman explained, “the guidelines table for sentencing drug crimes sets 
two to three grams at level twenty, three to four grams at level twenty-two, 
four to five grams at level twenty-four, and so on.”84  The result is an esca-
lating scale of punishment,85 based on incremental increases in drug quanti-
ty. 
Severity has significant human costs.  There is increasing awareness 
that the present operation of the criminal justice system has adverse impacts 
on families and communities,86 particularly minorities and the poor,87 and 
society more generally.88 
                                                          
 82.  Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (strengthening federal efforts to 
“eradicating” illicit drug sales and use).   
 83.  See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1309 (1997) (“The drug Guidelines . . . are anchored to mandatory mini-
mums rather than to past practice, because mandatory minimums represent a deliberate departure 
from past practice.”). 
 84.  Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101 YALE 
L.J. 2053, 2072–73 (1992) [hereinafter Judge Newman’s Remarks]. 
 85. See 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note, 41§ 5A. 
 86.  See PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON 
CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003); John Ha-
gan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, 
and Prisoners, in PRISONS 122 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999); cf. Carrie Johnson & 
Marisa Peñaloza, Judge Regrets Harsh Human Toll of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, NPR (Dec. 
16, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/16/370991710/judge-regrets-harsh-human-toll-of-
mandatory-minimum-sentences (“We talk about numbers, but at the end of the process it’s not a 
number that’s getting the sentence . . . .  It’s a person, a person with a family from a community.” 
(quoting then-U.S. District Judge John Gleeson)). 
 87.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING 
PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 23 
(2010) (“[From 2007–2009,] black male offenders received sentences that were 23.3 percent long-
er than those imposed on white males.”); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF 
GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 122 (2004). 
[A] typical Black or Hispanic offender has somewhat greater odds of being imprisoned 
when compared to a typical White offender. . . .  The odds of a typical Black drug of-
fender being sentenced to imprisonment are about 20 percent higher than the odds of a 
typical White offender, while the odds of a Hispanic drug offender are about 40 percent 
higher. 
Id.; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (Jeremy 
Travis et al. eds., 2014) (“Those who are incarcerated in U.S. prisons come largely from the most 
disadvantaged segments of the population.  They comprise mainly [of] minority men under age 
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E.  The Guidelines Are Not Reliably Followed 
Compliance with the Guidelines has tanked.  The mandatory Guide-
lines were to establish order in a sentencing world without standards in be-
tween statutory minimums and maximums.  But Booker rendered the 
Guidelines merely advisory.89  Diminished compliance and disparities fol-
lowed.90 
For example, in 1991, federal courts imposed non-government spon-
sored sentences below the Guidelines in roughly six percent of all cases,91 
meaning that courts decided that a non-Guidelines sentence was appropriate 
even though the government argued that the sentence should be within the 
Guidelines.  The situation is much different today.  According to a recent 
data report from the Commission, in 20.7% of cases courts impose a sen-
tence outside of the Guidelines system, notwithstanding government argu-
ments to stay within it.92  In some circuits, such as the Second and the Sev-
enth, non-government sponsored, non-Guideline sentences approach or are 
at the forty percent mark.93 
                                                          
40, poorly educated, and often carrying additional deficits of drug and alcohol addiction, mental 
and physical illness, and a lack of work preparation or experience.”). 
 88.  See United States v. Hiveley, 61 F.3d 1358, 1365 (8th Cir. 1995) (Bright, J., concurring) 
(“If [certain] low-level drug offenders serve an extra five years of imprisonment over what is a 
proper, non-guideline, sentence, the cost to the taxpayers exceeds one and three-quarters billion 
dollars ($1,794,760,000.00).”); United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1090–92 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(Bright, J., concurring). 
[T]he sentences imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines are often a waste of time and 
money. . . .  It costs the United States government and its taxpayers approximately 
$22,000 per year to keep a federal offender in prison. . . .  Th[e] sentence [in this case] 
is a waste of time, money, and more importantly, a man’s life.  These unwise Sentenc-
ing Guidelines put nonviolent offenders in prison for years, they ruin the lives of the 
prisoners, their families, and they also hurt our economy and our communities by drain-
ing billions of dollars from the taxpayers and keeping potentially productive members 
of society locked up.  The opportunity costs imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines are 
staggering. 
Chavez, 230 F.3d at 1091–92  (Bright, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also United States v. 
Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (“The cost to the taxpayers 
and in human lives [imposed by applying the Guidelines] has become enormous and shows no 
signs of change.”).  This is not to suggest that the underlying crimes do not hurt families, commu-
nities, and society, because they most undoubtedly do.  The issue, however, is that unduly severe 
sentences may themselves introduce externalities without sufficient justification.  See generally 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (requiring sentences to be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to 
further the purposes of punishment). 
 89.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).  
 90.  See Judge Pryor’s Response, supra note 63, at 280 (“[T]here can be no dispute that inter-
judge sentencing disparities, regardless of whether they contribute to demographic disparities, 
have substantially increased since Booker as a result of judges’ unfettered discretion to vary from 
the guidelines coupled with no meaningful appellate review.”). 
 91.  See Wilkins et al., supra note 76, at 325. 
 92.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 11 tbl.8 (2016). 
 93.  See id. at 12–14 tbl.9. 
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The extent to which courts deviate from the Guidelines reveals a fuller 
picture of non-compliance with the Guidelines.  Non-government spon-
sored, non-Guidelines sentences are, on average, 36.2% below the applica-
ble Guidelines minimum.94  The percentage of non-Guidelines sentences 
and the degree of the departures support the sense that there are, in effect, 
two types of sentencing judges: those who stick to the Guidelines and those 
who do not.95 
As Guidelines compliance has dropped, disparities have increased.  
The Commission has noted such disparities across the country and within 
the same district.96  “[E]mpirical evidence proves that sentencing dispari-
ties—the primary concern that led to the creation of the guidelines—have 
increased since the guidelines became advisory[,]” the Acting Chair of the 
Commission, United States Circuit Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., observed.97  
The evidence that the Guidelines are unable to fulfill the very reason they 
were put into existence calls into question the value of the Guidelines as a 
whole. 
F.  The Guidelines Do Not Promote Meaningful Appellate Review 
Federal appeals courts are effectively rubber-stamping the sentences of 
district courts.  Appellate courts are to review sentences under an abuse of 
discretion standard, which consists of two parts.98  Double-checking the 
math comprises the procedural reasonableness part of appellate review.99  
As former United States District Judge and current Harvard Law Professor 
Nancy Gertner acknowledged, “[t]he appellate courts are doing little more 
than checking the lower courts’ math—did you compute the numbers cor-
rectly—and if the computations are correct, affirming virtually every sen-
                                                          
 94.  See id. at 26 tbl.17.  
 95.  See Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Hon. William K. Sessions III, Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (June 28, 
2010), reprinted in 23 FED SENT’G REP. 282, 282–83 (2011) (“[T]here is the federal sentencing 
regime that remains closely tied to the sentencing guidelines. . . .  On the other hand, there is a 
second regime that has largely lost its moorings to the sentencing guidelines.”). 
 96.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED 
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 8 (2012) (“Variation in the rates of non-government 
sponsored below range sentences among judges within the same district has increased in most dis-
tricts since Booker, indicating that sentencing outcomes increasingly depend upon the judge to 
whom the case is assigned.”). 
 97.  Judge Pryor’s Remarks, supra note 63, at 95; see also Sessions, supra note 60, at 329–30 
(“[D]isparities in federal sentencing—both inter-judge and demographic disparities—have been 
increasing steadily” since Booker.). 
 98.  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  
 99.  See id.; see also Judge Pryor’s Remarks, supra note 63, at 99 (“After Booker, appellate 
courts continue to check the district court’s math about guidelines minutiae—what is called re-
view for ‘procedural reasonableness.’”). 
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tence . . . .”100  If an appeals court happens to find a calculation error and 
sends the case back, the district court will correct the numbers and find a 
way to arrive at the same sentence.101  In the second part of the appellate re-
view, the court is to ensure, based on the totality of the circumstances, that 
the sentence is substantively reasonable.102  The substantive reasonableness 
is helped along by a presumption that a within-Guidelines sentence is rea-
sonable.103  Judge Pryor revealed that he “and other appellate judges liken 
[substantive reasonableness] to deciding whether a sentence ‘shocks the 
conscience.’”104  “This highly deferential review rarely leads to reversals,” 
he added.105 
* * * 
These issues suggest that the problems with the Guidelines are signifi-
cant and likely cannot be saved by way of further modifications on the mar-
gins.106  As Judge Pryor boldly stated, “[i]nstead of continuing to tinker 
with the advisory guidelines, we now need to tackle a more fundamental re-
form.”107  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s remedy in Booker was to be a “tem-
porary fix,”108 indicating that lasting, robust change should follow.  Twelve 
years and half-a-million federal defendants later, there has not been any 
such meaningful solution.109  Ironically, Congress instructed that the Guide-
lines are to be grounded in evidence.110  The evidence offered in this Part 
supports the finding of a crisis demanding at least the consideration of a dif-
ferent paradigm.111 
                                                          
 100.  Judge Nancy Gertner (Ret.), Opinions I Should Have Written, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 
438 (2016).  But see Gall, 552 U.S. at 68 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Appellate review for abuse of 
discretion is not an empty formality.”). 
 101.  Judge Pryor’s Remarks, supra note 63, at 99. 
 102.  See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
 103.  See id. 
 104.  Judge Pryor’s Remarks, supra note 63, at 99. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 49, at 6 (proposing that the Guidelines be “scrapped in their 
entirety and replaced”). 
 107.  Judge Pryor’s Remarks, supra note 63, at 96. 
 108.  Id. at 95; see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005) (“The ball now lies in 
Congress’ court.  The National Legislature is equipped to devise and install, long-term, the sen-
tencing system . . . .”). 
 109.  See Judge Pryor’s Remarks, supra note 63, at 95. 
 110.  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2012) (requiring that the Guidelines be revised in light of “data 
coming to [the Commission’s] attention”); see also United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 140 (1st 
Cir. 1990) (“We have embarked on a new course. . . . Only time will tell whether the use of the 
guidelines will result in an improvement over the old system.” (citation omitted) (citing United 
States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 962, 967 (1st Cir. 1989))). 
 111.  See Sessions, supra note 60, at 310 (“My proposed system would not be perfect . . . .  At 
the very least, my proposal is intended to advance the dialogue regarding changes that are need-
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IV.  TOWARDS THE SECOND FOUNDING 
This Article seeks to lay the groundwork for that alternative federal 
sentencing system.112  Before detailing this new system, it is important to 
address and dispense with the proposition that federal judges should not 
have a guide at all.113  It is true that, without such a coordinated system, ju-
dicial discretion would be maximized.  But, judges, bound only by constitu-
tional or statutory constraints, would be without the benefit of further in-
formation that can help channel that discretion.114  This hands-off approach 
would reintroduce the very arbitrariness that helped give rise to the Guide-
                                                          
ed.”).  The identification of concerns with the Guidelines and the introduction of a different model 
should not be construed as an attack on, or criticism of, the Commission.  Indeed, Congress estab-
lished the parameters for the Guidelines, and the Commission’s subsequent responses are con-
sistent with, if not mandated or encouraged by, the SRA and congressional intent.  See Stith & 
Koh, supra note 33, at 284 (“[O]ur examination of the statute and its legislative history demon-
strates, we believe, that, by and large, the Commission has implemented the Sentencing Reform 
Act in a manner consistent with legislative intent. . . .  Many provisions of the statute either man-
date or strongly encourage the policy choices that the Commission made . . . .”).  Even with the 
limited parameters provided, it is difficult to design a workable sentencing system that balances 
uniformity and proportionality.  See William W. Wilkins, Jr., The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Striking an Appropriate Balance, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 571, 573–75 (1992) (discussing the ten-
sion between uniformity, proportionality, and workability).  Additionally, it is difficult to design a 
sentencing system that can reconcile the competing purposes of punishment.  See Ilene H. Nagel 
& Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Develop-
ment, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 
230 (1993) (maintaing that building “perfect” guidelines is not attainable, therefore, the goal is to 
create one that is workable and an improvement upon the status quo); Sessions, supra note 60, at 
310 (“[N]o sentencing system ever will come close to being perfect.”). 
 112.  Others, including Commissioners, have proposed different Guidelines models as well.  
See Judge Pryor’s Remarks, supra note 63; Sessions, supra note 60, at 310; Ruback & Wroblew-
ski, supra note 66, at 770; see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids, A Proposal for Re-
configuring Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 150 (2005).  These 
proposals still assign numbers to facts and then fit those numbers into a more concise table.  This 
Article, by contrast, emphasizes arguments over the meaning of facts without affixing any numer-
ical value to those facts.  The Commission itself took a stab at a more concise Guidelines manual.  
It failed to change the fundamental nature of the numbers-driven approach to the Guidelines.  See 
Simplification Draft Paper, supra note 64.  Also, the draft simplified guidelines are stale, having 
been authored in 1996.  Id.  
 113.  See Van Meter, supra note 67 (suggesting that only two sentencing schemes exist: “a 
world where a person’s actions are treated as part of a mathematical equation blind to context, or a 
world where political appointees decide people’s fates based on gut feelings”). 
 114.  The six-month sentence imposed on a former Stanford University student for raping an 
unconscious woman—widely perceived as too lenient, the product of the sentencing judge’s sym-
pathy for the defendant in light of some shared circumstances, and the sentencing judge’s consid-
eration of irrelevant facts—is Exhibit A supporting some sort of guidelines system.  See Paul Cas-
sell, What Sentence Should the Former Stanford Swimmer Have Gotten?, WASH. POST (June 7, 
2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/06/07/what-sentence-
should-the-stanford-swimmer-have-gotten/ (comparing the six-month sentence to sentencing un-
der the Guidelines, that, for a first-time offender, would have been at least ninety-seven months 
and would not count the defendant’s voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor).  
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lines in the first place.115  Accordingly, as Judge Newman noted, “we can 
and should find a place for discretion between the two poles of unfettered 
discretion and no discretion,”116 with the goal of avoiding unwarranted dis-
parities as well as undue uniformity.117  The essence and promise of this 
guide are the following sentencing principles. 
A. The Statutory Grade Shall Be the Starting Point for a Sentencing 
Determination 
A fundamental issue with respect to sentencing is how to rank the 
4,000–5,000 federal offenses118 by their relative seriousness.119  Initial 
drafts of the Guidelines responded to this task by inserting completely sub-
jective values for offenses and corresponding offense characteristics.120  
The first published draft, as noted above, predicated penalty levels on past 
practice data, codifying what judges had been doing in the studied cases.121  
The draft prepared by Commissioner Paul Robinson also categorized feder-
al offenses into general categories, and this grouping was retained in subse-
quent drafts and in the published Guidelines.122 
As it turns out, Congress already has categorized and ranked offenses.  
It has done so in the form of offense grades. The assigned grades reflect 
Congress’s determination as to the relative seriousness of the offense.123  
For example, a Class C felony authorizes punishment of “less than twenty-
five years but ten or more years,”124 and the Class D felony authorizes pun-
ishment of “less than ten years but five or more years.”125 
                                                          
 115.  See Newman, supra note 30, at 1564 (“Without any guidance on sentencing, is it any 
wonder that sentences appear to be all over the lot?  Without any law to apply, judges simply have 
to make it up as we go along.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005) (No. 04-104) (“[I]n discretionary sentencing . . . [a judge] can just look at you 
and say, ‘I think you’re a bad actor, you’ve got forty years.’”).  
 116.  See Judge Newman’s Remarks, supra note 84, at 2073. 
 117.  See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION: PUBLIC HEARING 136 (Feb. 10–11, 
2009), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/transcript.pdf (“It is better to have five good sen-
tences and five bad ones than to have ten bad but consistent sentences.”). 
 118.  See Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 
1198–99 (2015). 
 119.  Others have sought to identify the seriousness of offenses.  See Peter H. Rossi et al., The 
Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 224, 
228–29 tbl.1 (1974) (ranking 140 offenses according to seriousness).  
 120.  See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 18, at 1203 (noting that the September 1986 draft had 
“placeholders” for penalty levels not based on data); id. at 1229 (noting the “Just Deserts” draft 
contained harm values assigned by Commissioner Robinson).  
 121.  See supra note 55. 
 122.  See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 18, at 1202, 1228.  
 123.  SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 51. 
 124.  18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) (2012). 
 125.  Id. § 3559(a)(4). 
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The Commission should draw upon statutory grades.  The reasons to 
do so are several.  First, Congress directed the Commission to consider of-
fense grades in developing the Guidelines.126  The current Guidelines rely 
on these grades to a limited degree, as the Guidelines authorize terms of su-
pervised release by offense grades.127  Second, these grades may be owed 
greater deference, as Congress ostensibly codified the will of the people in 
setting the offense grades.  Third, the grades are not random or without sub-
stance, but are designed to capture relative seriousness.  The grades thus 
stand as a readily available, congressionally approved, statutorily memorial-
ized, simplified, default way to organize and rank federal offenses.128 
It is important to acknowledge that the federal criminal code is consid-
ered a mess129 and that congressional attempts at federal criminal code re-
form have failed.130  Indeed, in the 1980s, the only part of federal criminal 
code reform that survived was the Sentencing Reform Act.131  Given the 
state of the federal criminal code, some may balk at any suggestion that 
penalty levels should be informed by offense grades.  As to this likely ob-
jection, I note three things: first, this Article proposes that the offense 
grades be deployed as the default starting point for penalty levels; second, 
Congress already has directed the Commission to consider offense grades 
and the grades, however uncoordinated, nonetheless enjoy the status of fed-
eral law; and third, as explained below, the Commission may adjust the 
penalty levels otherwise dictated by offense grades in view of sentencing 
data, and the expert and informed commentary of the sentencing communi-
ty.132  If Congress has failed at criminal code reform, there is nothing pre-
venting the Commission, delegated by Congress to serve as an expert body 
on federal sentencing, from bringing greater clarity and coherence to the 
code.  It has had over thirty years to do precisely this.  At the end of the 
day, offense grades would serve as the jumping off point for penalty levels, 
rather than be brushed aside entirely as if criminal offenses operate on a 
clean legal slate. 
The offense grade is not the only statutory penalty that applies to crim-
inal offenses.  In certain instances, Congress also has specified statutory 
                                                          
 126.  28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(1) (2012). 
 127.  2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 39, § 5D1.2. 
 128.  See Judge Pryor’s Response, supra note 63, at 279 (acknowledging that, with code re-
form, “a guideline model based primarily on the offense of conviction might be appropriate for the 
federal system”).   
 129.  See id. (referring to the federal criminal code as “a crazy-quilt of over 4,000 crimes 
spread throughout dozens of titles of the United States Code and enacted by many Congresses 
over several decades”). 
 130.  See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 18, at 1175–76. 
 131.  See id. at 1176. 
 132.  See infra Part III.H. 
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minimums and/or maximums that apply to criminal offenses.  For example, 
the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), the transportation of child por-
nography, carries with it a mandatory minimum of five years and a statutory 
maximum of twenty years.133  Accordingly, in addition to identifying the 
grade of the offense, a judge also must determine if Congress has enacted a 
statutory minimum or maximum that further restricts the sentencing range 
otherwise dictated by the statutory grade. 
B.  The Midpoint Between the Applicable Statutory Range Shall Be the 
Default Sentence 
To the extent that guidelines are supposed to serve as a “national 
norm,”134 the governing statutory grades will put counsel and judges in a 
general ballpark for the sentence to apply for each offense.  An offender 
who commits a Class C felony, for example, will know the statutory range 
of the punishment.  An offender who transports child pornography will 
know there are statutory minimums and maximums that adjust the statutory 
range for a Class C felony. 
But the offense of conviction, the statutory grade, and the mandatory 
minimums/maximums will only get a sentencing judge so far.  Narrowing 
that ballpark even further can be accomplished by way of insisting that the 
default sentence would be the midpoint of the statutory maximum and min-
imum.  For a Class C felony, for example, that midpoint would be seven-
teen-and-one-half years.135  In circumstances in which Congress has speci-
fied an alternate statutory minimum and/or maximum for violations of a 
particular statute, the operative midpoint would be between these mini-
mums and/or maximums.  For example, Congress has set the maximum 
penalty for a violation for a particular Class C felony at twenty years.136  
Though the general range for a Class C felony is ten to twenty-five years, 
and the midpoint seventeen-and-one-half years, the statutory cap for that 
particular Class C Felony is twenty years, meaning the midpoint would be 
between ten and twenty years—fifteen years. 
There is an important caveat to this rule.  The application of this model 
to actual cases, in infra Part V.A., demonstrates that there is significant dis-
tance between the sentences dictated by this model and the sentences gener-
ally imposed under the current Guidelines.  A drastic change from past 
practice may invite revolt from the federal judiciary.  It bears reminding 
that, as to be explained more fully in infra Part V.B, the Commission would 
                                                          
 133. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (2012). 
 134.  See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Gonza-
lez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 738 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 135.  18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) (2012). 
 136.  8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2008). 
 2018]      THE SECOND FOUNDING OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 507 
 
be empowered by statute and by this model to modify the midpoint in light 
of past practice and its considered expert judgment.137 
C.  The “Typical” Case Shall Receive a Sentence Within 25% of the 
Average of the Applicable Statutory Grade 
One of the key elements of the SRA is the infamous “25% rule.”138  
While this Article is critical of the present numbers-centric approach to fed-
eral sentencing, the 25% rule helps explain why the Commission relied so 
heavily on a quantitative approach to the Guidelines.  In particular, the SRA 
directed the Commission to establish sentencing “range[s].”139  The SRA 
also demanded that, for prison sentences, the difference between the high-
end and low-end of any such range be 25% or no greater than six months, 
whichever is greater.140 
The 25% rule leaves little doubt that the ranges were to be numerically 
expressed.141  It also helps explain the large number of boxes in the Guide-
lines.142  More specifically, the Commission determined that, to comply 
with the “25% rule” and to produce overlapping ranges to reduce litigation 
disputes, forty-three offense levels would be needed.143  Without the over-
lap, the argument goes, every factual difference could lead to a completely 
different sentencing range, each difference would become that much more 
significant in real terms, and factual conflicts between counsels would in-
tensify.144 
Congress expected that sentences would not differ by more than 25% 
for cases with similar offenses and offenders.145  The 25% range thus repre-
sented where the “typical” case would fall.146  If a case presented a fact or 
circumstance to an unusual degree, the Commission invited the judge to de-
                                                          
 137.  28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2012).  
 138.  Id. § 994(b)(2).  
 139.  Id. § 994(b)(1). 
 140.  Id. § 994(b)(2).  
 141.  But see Marc Miller, True Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
587, 590–95 (1992).  
 142.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 15 (1987). 
 143.  2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, ch.1, pt. A, introductory cmt.  Forty-three offense levels 
and six criminal history categories yields a 258-cell grid.  
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 79 (“If the sentencing court believed the 
case was an entirely typical one for the applicable guideline category, it would have no adequate 
justification for deviating from the recommended range.”). 
 146.  See id. 
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part, or impose a sentence outside of the 25% range.147  Thus, the 25% rule 
gave judges some wiggle room within which to operate, but ultimately lim-
ited judicial discretion to this 25% window for ordinary cases.  This struc-
tured discretion would, for the heartland of cases, curb sentencing dispari-
ties. 
This Article similarly provides that the sentences for typical cases shall 
not differ from the midpoint of the applicable statutory range by more than 
25%.  In this respect, the Article retains the core purpose of the 25% rule: to 
allow judges discretion to facilitate proportional sentencing, and to cap that 
discretion to obviate undue sentencing disparities.  To the extent that the 
25% window seems generous, in practice the discretion of judges will be 
limited to 12.5%.  This is because judges, drawing on the aggravating and 
mitigating factors, will be able to identify whether the case generally is an 
aggravated or mitigated one148; judges then would be able to pinpoint, with 
reference to the enumerated factors, where along the 12.5% spectrum the 
case fits. 
This Article also provides that, as in the Guidelines system, a judge 
may depart from the 25% window if the judge states, on the record, that an 
aggravating or mitigating factor is present to an unusual degree.149  Depar-
tures will trigger a reinvigorated form of appellate review, described be-
low.150  To comply with the other part of the 25% rule—that the minimum 
and maximum range be no more than six months apart—six-month ranges 
can be located within the 25% window.  These internal ranges can serve as 
six-month markers that counsel and judges could then use to identify where 
along the 25% spectrum the sentence can and should fall. 
The first three principles—using the statutory grade as the starting 
point for a sentencing determination, basing adjustments from the applica-
ble average sentence on enumerated and unweighted aggravating and miti- 
  
                                                          
 147.  See 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, ch. 1 pt. A, introductory cmt. (“When a court finds an 
atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct signifi-
cantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.”). 
 148.  See Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 66, at 771. 
 149.  This concept in the Guidelines seems to be well-received.  See Michael W. McConnell, 
The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 682 (2006) (“[T]he Guidelines continue to be the 
benchmark for responsible judging, with variances only for unusual cases.”). 
 150.  See infra Part IV.D. 
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gating factors, and requiring adjustments for ordinary cases to be within 
25% of the applicable average, and within internal six-month ranges—
would yield the following: 
 
Grade Statutory Min-imum 
Statutory Max-
imum Midpoint 
Low-end 
of 25% 
High-end of 
25% Range 
Class A 
Felony Life Life Life Life Life 
Class B 
Felony 25 years 61 years151 43 years 
37 years, 8 
months 
48 years, 5 
months 
Class C 
Felony 10 years 25 years 
17 years, 6 
months 
13 years, 2 
months 
21 years, 11 
months 
Class D 
Felony 5 years 10 years 
7 years, 6 
months 
5 years, 8 
months 
9 years, 5 
months 
Class E 
Felony 1 year 5 years 3 years 
2 years, 3 
months 
3 years, 9 
months 
Class A 
Misd. 6 months 1 year 9 months 7 months 11 months 
Class B 
Misd. 30 days 6 months 3.5 months 3 months 4 months 
Class C 
Misd. 5 days 30 days 17.5 days 13 days 22 days 
 
D. Adjustments from the Midpoint Shall Be Based on Enumerated, 
Unquantified Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
To individualize the sentence, a judge may move upwards or down-
wards from the midpoint based on enumerated factors.  No fixed numerical 
values will be assigned to the factors.  Instead, counsel will offer, and judg-
es consider, arguments as to the applicability and meaning of the factors.152  
Accordingly, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges will have more of an 
opportunity to influence sentencing.  At present, sentencing is largely a me-
                                                          
 151.  Class B felonies specify a numerical statutory minimum of twenty-five years, but contain 
a non-numerical statutory maximum. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(2).  As Class A felonies dictate only 
life, id. § (a)(1), Class B felonies are understood to cover twenty-five years to life.  See, e.g., Unit-
ed States v. Good, 25 F.3d 218, 220–21 (4th Cir. 1994).  Life expectancy for males in the United 
States is seventy-nine years.  Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2014, 65 NAT’L 
VITAL STATS’ REPS., NO. 4, JUNE 30, 2016, at 1, 4, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr65nvsr65_04.pdf.  An offender reaches adult status at eight-
een-years old.  2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, §4A1.2(d)(2).  Accordingly, the de facto life term 
reasonably may be considered sixty-one years. 
 152.  See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (“[C]ourts are competent to judge the grav-
ity of an offense, at least on a relative scale.  In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments . . . .”). 
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chanical practice, akin to accounting, in which prosecutors and defense 
counsel tend to focus narrowly on the Guidelines scores in the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report (“PSR”).153  Under this Article’s proposal, however, 
the PSR will not have such a decisive, if not determinative, impact on the 
ultimate sentence.  Nor would the influence of prosecutors and defense 
counsel be effectively limited to challenging numbers in the PSR.  Instead, 
counsel would have greater space to influence sentencing with substantive 
arguments, as they would be able to contest not only the relevance of enu-
merated factors, but also the qualitative weight to be assigned to the rele-
vant factors.  Moreover, the primary temporal focus of counsel would no 
longer be the stage at which the PSR is prepared and objected to, but would 
shift to the sentencing hearing.154  Significantly, with the relevance and 
weight of factors up for grabs, to be claimed by counsel, sentencing would 
ease the leverage held by prosecutors and resemble a more balanced sen-
tencing process.155 
This approach has other, ancillary benefits.  The factors would effec-
tively standardize the considerations that inform federal sentencing.  The 
factors would focus analyses by probation officers, arguments by prosecu-
tion and defense counsel, and determinations by judges.  As judges engag-
ing in sentencing decision-making would proceed down the same path, us-
ing the same closed universe of factors, the extent of prosecutorial leverage 
and the prospects for sentencing outcomes to result in undue disparities may 
be minimized.156  In rooting sentencing in factors, this Article’s proposal 
would pull federal sentencing closer to what Judge Frankel had in mind 
when he suggested national sentencing guidelines.  In particular, Judge 
Frankel suggested a “checklist of factors.”157  Moreover, turning to factors 
                                                          
 153.  As one federal public defender has told the Author, his job as a public defender was ef-
fectively reduced to two tasks: (1) making arguments to the probation officer that will result in the 
lowest Guidelines range possible, and (2) encouraging his client to accept the plea offer in light of 
the (hopefully lowered) Guidelines range set forth by the probation officer in the PSR.  
 154.  See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land): The Long Search for 
Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 726 (1999) (“[The Guidelines 
have] raise[d] the analysis of probation officers above the arguments of lawyers and the reasoning 
of judges . . . .”). 
 155.  See generally Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (“There is no doubt that 
the breadth of discretion that our country’s legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with 
it the potential for both individual and institutional abuse.”). 
 156.  See Judge Pryor’s Response, supra note 63, at 281 (“[I]n a simpler system with fewer 
sentencing decision-points, prosecutors will have less opportunity, not more, to manipulate sen-
tences.”) 
 157.  FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 30, at 114.  To be sure, Judge Frankel also 
stated that the factors should be accompanied by “some form of numerical or other objective grad-
ing.”  Id.  This may lead some to suggest that only a numbers-based system would realize Judge 
Frankel’s vision.  But doing so would ignore the “or” in the sentence, which suggests that the 
grading could be numerical or non-numerical. 
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would reduce the emphasis on numbers in the federal sentencing system 
and fill the void with qualitative factors. 
1.  The Source of the Factors 
A critical choice in the formulation of a multi-factor guideline system 
is the selection of the factors themselves.158  The possibilities are endless.  
In the end, this Article identifies twenty factors that Congress itself enu-
merated in the SRA159 and detailed in the comprehensive legislative history 
of the SRA.160 
Turning to Congress makes sense for at least three reasons.  First, the 
statutory list of factors is ostensibly, as is the nature of federal legislation, 
the product of significant effort and compromise.161  A list that has gone 
through the legislative process has value over any independent set of factors 
that are developed from scratch and do not have congressional support.  
Second, the factors are already part of federal law and the congressional 
record.162  Accordingly, the sentencing policies contemplated by this Article 
are less drastic because they rely on existing law and the broader sense of 
Congress.  Third, the expectation is that these factors will be exhaustive, 
representing all relevant factors.163  Relying on Congress obviates the po-
tential for a judge or counsel to invent other factors, and thereby obviates 
the reintroduction of sentencing inconsistencies.164 
The factors in the SRA are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 994(c), which cor-
responds with offense conduct, and 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), which corresponds 
                                                          
 158.  As the selection of factors entails choices, I must emphasize that this Article proposes 
and applies one factor-based system—it should not be construed as the definitive answer to 
whether any factor-based sentencing regime works.  It, at most, should be read as a study of one 
particular factor-based model. 
 159.  28 U.S.C. §§ 994(c)–(d) (2012). 
 160.  SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 169–170. 
 161.  See United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (“[O]ften . . . legislation is the product of multiple and somewhat inconsistent purposes that 
led to certain compromises.”); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 15, 22 (2014) (“Con-
gressional decisionmaking is the product of multiple decision points . . . .  The laws of Congress 
are the product of often complex institutional processes, which engage legislators, staff, and other 
interests with stakes in the outcome.”).  Several bills ultimately led to the SRA, which involved a 
number of back-and-forths between the House and Senate.  See Stith & Koh, supra note 33, at 
223–25. 
 162.  See 28 U.S. § 994(c). 
 163.  To the extent that one may be concerned that Congress may enact additional aggravating 
factors, thus generally enhancing sentences, the deliberate legislative process may diminish the 
specter of such “factor-creep.” See Judge Pryor’s Response, supra note 63, at 281. 
 164.  By contrast, Congress expressly invites judges to depart when “the court finds that there 
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012).  This invaria-
bly will generate disparities, though appellate review is to guard against unwarranted disparities.  
See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96–97 (1996). 
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with the offender’s background.  This Article builds on the statutory factors 
by recognizing additional factors fleshed out in the legislative history of the 
SRA.  The existing statutory factors can be quite general and, when one 
looks to the legislative history, the meaning of the skeletal factors can be 
more readily understood.  For example, the statute directs a sentencing 
judge to consider “the circumstances under which the offense was commit-
ted which mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense,”165 but the 
legislative history explains that these circumstances may include “the 
amount of harm done,” “whether a weapon was carried or used,” “whether 
the defendant was a lone participant in the offense,” and whether the de-
fendant “participated with others in a major or minor way. . . .”166  Similar-
ly, the existing statutory factors address the harm caused by the offense,167 
but do not expressly include the harm intended by the offense.  The legisla-
tive history, however, expressly indicates that a sentence should reflect “the 
harm done or threatened by the offense.”168  Thus, “harm” for purposes of 
the factors includes not only actual harm, but intended harm as well.  In 
sum, this Article brings to light the considerations detailed, but buried, in 
the legislative history. 
This Article also mines federal court opinions in order to ensure that 
proper meaning is given to existing statutory factors.  Consider a situation 
in which an offender defrauds victims out of their life savings.  In order to 
capture loss from a qualitative standpoint, federal courts have increased an 
offender’s sentence using the vulnerable victim enhancement.169  But the 
proper focus of this enhancement is the nature of the victims, such as 
whether they are inexperienced, elderly, or otherwise susceptible to fraud, 
not the extent of the loss.170  Also, federal courts in these same situations 
have based an upward departure on the psychological injury enhance-
ment,171 as victims invariably suffer mental harm if their life savings are si-
phoned by a fraudster.172  But the use of this enhancement is problematic in 
that it rests the upward departure on the symptom—psychological impact—
rather than the cause of the symptom—for example, the degree to which the 
offender has suffered an economic loss.  Rather than continue the practice 
                                                          
 165.  28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2). 
 166.  SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 75. 
 167.  28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(3).  
 168.  See SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 76 (emphasis added). 
 169.  This enhancement is grounded in SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 170, and 
found in 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 29, § 3A1.1(b)(1). 
 170.  See, e.g., United States v. Sheneman, Nos. 3:10–CR–00120 (01) JD, 3:10–CR–00126 
(02) JD, 2012 WL 2906859, at *16 (N.D. Ind. July 16, 2012). 
 171.  This enhancement is grounded in SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 157, and is 
found in 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 5K2.3. 
 172.  See, e.g., United States v. Waldner, 564 F. Supp. 2d 911, 941–42 (N.D. Iowa 2008). 
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of courts grafting upward departures onto vulnerable victim or psychologi-
cal harm enhancements, courts using this Article’s formulation need only 
use an enumerated factor: the extent of the harm or loss caused by the de-
fendant.  Doing so would reflect the honest basis for the sentence aggrava-
tion, and reserves the vulnerable victim and psychological injury factors for 
circumstances that directly warrant their use. 
This Article’s formulation also addresses a major concern with the cur-
rent Guidelines: that the quantitative amount of loss and drugs in a case 
dominate the assessment of an offender’s culpability,173 with less attention 
given to the role that the offender may have in the underlying offense.174  
For example, a participant in a drug conspiracy may serve a significant sen-
tence if the offender was caught with substantial quantities of narcotics, 
even if the offender was a “low-level” participant; the lengthy sentence 
would reflect the large amount of drugs because the amount is a proxy for 
culpability.175  Under this Article’s factor-based model, however, intent, 
motive, and role would be on par with (and not subordinate to) quantitative 
or qualitative harm. 
This Article makes only one omission from the factors culled from the 
statute and legislative history: “the deterrent effect a particular sentence 
may have on the commission of the offense by others.”176  This is because, 
as noted below, deterrence considerations under this model are deemed, 
consistent with the Model Penal Code, to be limited by retributive consider-
ations.177 
                                                          
 173.  See, e.g., United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he 
Sentencing Guidelines, because of their arithmetic approach and also in an effort to appear ‘objec-
tive,’ tend to place great weight on putatively measurable quantities, such as the weight of drugs 
in narcotics cases or the amount of financial loss in fraud cases.”); Editorial Board, Cut Sentences 
for Low-Level Drug Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/opinion/cut-sentences-for-low-level-drug-
crimes.html?mcubz=0 (“[A] person’s sentence is determined by his role in a drug operation, and 
not by the entire amount of drugs found in that operation, which is a poor measure of culpabil-
ity.”). 
 174.  See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 22 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[A]pplication of the 
Guidelines’ monetary tables [can] bear[] little or no relationship to the defendant’s role in the of-
fense and greatly magnifies the sentence.”). 
 175.  See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, No. 11–CR–00821–2 (JG), 2013 WL 322243, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) (“[T]he Guidelines ranges for drug trafficking offenses are not based 
on . . . the actual culpability of defendants. . . .  Instead, they are driven by drug type and quantity, 
which are poor proxies for culpability.”).  Accordingly, the Guideline “produce[] ranges that are 
excessively severe across a broad range of cases.”  Id.  The same may be said of fraud, which also 
ties culpability to loss figures.  See, e.g., United States v. Desmond, No. 05 CR 729-4, 2008 WL 
686779, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2008) (“[A] low-level employee, who had no role in devising the 
fraud scheme and would have received no financial benefit, is subject to several years of incarcer-
ation under the Guidelines.”). 
 176.  28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(6) (2012). 
 177.  See infra notes 274–281 and accompanying text.  
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2.  The Factors 
The factors may be presented in the form of a sentencing worksheet 
that may be included in a PSR.  Such a worksheet would be similar to a 
Statement of Reasons (“SOR”) form already contained in PSRs, in that both 
have checklists of factors.  The proposed worksheet would replace or, at a 
minimum, revise the current SOR.  One may shirk at the length of such a 
worksheet, but the contemplated worksheet and current SORs are compara-
ble in length.  Indeed, SORs were recently expanded to include thirty-four 
enumerated reasons to depart and twenty-three enumerated reasons to 
vary.178 
A judge shall make specific adjustments to a sentence on the basis of 
the following factors: 
The circumstances under which the offense was committed:179 
The offender’s intent180 
The offender’s motive181 
The offender’s role in the offense182 
Whether the offense was committed spontaneously or was 
the result of substantial planning183 
Whether the offense was committed under duress not rising 
to the level of a defense, which mitigates the seriousness of 
the offense184 
Whether a weapon was used, or the use of a weapon was 
threatened, in the commission of the offense185 
The vulnerability of the victim(s)186 
The nature of harm caused or intended by the offense:187 
Whether it involved property, irreplaceable property, a per-
son, or a number of persons188 
                                                          
 178.  See U.S. Fed. Courts, Judgment in a Criminal Case Form AO 245B (Rev. 11/16). 
 179.  28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2). 
 180.  SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 170 (asserting that the Commission may con-
sider “whether the offense was committed in reckless disregard of the safety of others”); see also 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (“It is fundamental that ‘causing harm intentionally 
must be punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.’” (quoting H. L. A. 
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 162 (1968))); see, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 
568, 575 (2009) (“[A]n accidental discharge is less culpable than intentional brandishment.”).  
 181.  See 1987 U.S.S.G. supra note 9, § 1B1.3(a); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293–
94 (1983) (“A court . . . is entitled to look at a defendant’s motive in committing a crime.  Thus a 
murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pursuant to a contract.”). 
 182.  SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 75. 
 183.  Id. at 170. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(3) (2012); see also SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 76. 
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The actual or intended qualitative impact of the harm on the 
victim(s)189 
Whether the offense was particularly heinous190 
The public response to and the frequency of the offense type, 
including the community view of the gravity of the of-
fense,191 the public concern generated by the offense,192 and 
the current incidence of the offense in the community and in 
the Nation as a whole193 
The offender’s criminal history, including:194 
The number of prior criminal acts195 
The seriousness of such acts196 
The remoteness or recentness of such acts197 
Offender’s characteristics: 
Degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a liveli-
hood198 
Age; an elderly and infirm defendant is a mitigating factor199 
Mental and emotional condition to the extent that such con-
dition mitigates the defendant’s culpability or to the extent 
that such condition is otherwise plainly relevant200 
Post-Offense behavior: 
The offender’s acceptance of responsibility,201 including the 
offender’s amenability to available rehabilitative program-
ming which may include evidence of completion of any 
post-offense rehabilitative programming202 
Obstruction of justice203 
A judge shall consider the following offender factors only for 
purposes of determining the appropriate sentencing form: 
                                                          
 188.  28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(3). 
 189.  See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text; see 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, 
§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A). 
 190.  SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 170. 
 191.  28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4). 
 192.  Id. § 994(c)(5). 
 193.  Id. § 994(c)(7). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 174. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  28 U.S.C. § 994 (d)(11). 
 199.  Id. § 994(d)(1). 
 200.  Id. § 994(d)(4). 
 201.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (2012). 
 202.  2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1 (asserting that acceptance of responsibil-
ity includes “post-offense rehabilitative efforts (for example, counseling or drug treatment)”). 
 203.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1510–15 (2012). 
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Education, vocational skills, and previous employment rec-
ord only for the purpose of determining whether probation 
may be an appropriate sentence, and not for purposes of sup-
porting a sentence of imprisonment or determining the 
length of a sentence of imprisonment204 
Family ties and responsibilities and community ties only for 
the purpose of determining, if imprisonment is recommend-
ed, the location of the prison facility, the use of furlough, 
and the location of pre-custody release205 
Physical condition, including drug dependence only for the 
purpose of determining whether treatment may be included 
as part of an appropriate sentence, and not for purposes of 
supporting a sentence of imprisonment or determining the 
length of a sentence of imprisonment206 
Age, only for an elderly and infirm defendant, if a form of 
punishment such as home confinement might be equally ef-
ficient as and less costly than incarceration207 
Another component of the sentencing worksheet, the statutory over-
rides, will be explained below.208 
It is worth noting that the process discussed herein—the use of offense 
grades to identify the relative seriousness of the offense and the use of fac-
tors to determine an individualized sentence—is akin to the current Guide-
lines system which requires judges to look first to the base offense level, 
corresponding with the offense of conviction, and then to make adjustments 
based on specific offense characteristics corresponding with the real offense 
conduct.  Accordingly, this Article maintains one of the major policy choic-
es of the Guidelines: a modified charged-offense system.  The initial Com-
mission struggled with whether to adopt a real-offense or charged-offense 
approach; a draft of the Guidelines used a pure real-offense system but 
moved to a modified charged-offense system.209  While there are admitted 
problems with the selected approach, there are problems with any sentenc-
ing system whether pure real-offense, pure-charged offense, or a hybrid.210 
In the end, this Article agrees with the Commission’s ultimate decision 
that drawing on both real offense and charged offense is most appropriate: 
the charge (what the offender is convicted of doing) assures that those con-
victed of the same offense receive similar sentences, and the real offense 
                                                          
 204.  SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 174.  
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 173. 
 207.  2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 5H1.1. 
 208.  See infra Part IV.G.  
 209.  See Nagel, supra note 51, at 925–26. 
 210.  See Wilkins, supra note 111, at 576–77. 
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(what the offender did) allows for adjustments to ensure that the sentence is 
particular to the offender. 
E.  Aggravating Factors Must Be Proved to a Jury Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt 
The Sixth Amendment establishes the right to a jury trial in criminal 
cases.211  The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to re-
quire a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact that results in a 
sentencing enhancement, unless the fact is the fact of a prior conviction212 
or the fact was admitted by the defendant.213  In Booker, the Court held that 
the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because the Guidelines per-
mitted a judge, not a jury, to find a fact (other than a prior conviction and 
other than what was admitted by the defendant) that enhanced a sentence.214 
This Article asserts that a judge may base a sentencing enhancement, 
other than the two traditional exceptions, only on aggravating facts that 
have been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.215  This rule rein-
forces the Constitution, arms defendants with added protection, puts the 
onus on the government to prove aggravating facts as it already does at the 
conviction stage, and provides a jury-based limit on what a judge may con-
sider in enhancing an offender’s sentence, thus minimizing unwarranted 
factual variations and unwarranted sentencing disparities.  An important 
consequence of this rule is that acquitted conduct—that which forms part of 
the real-offense conduct but has not been proven to a jury beyond a reason-
able doubt216—could not be used by a judge to enhance a sentence.217  This 
is not an abstract rule: post-Booker experimentation with such a rule at the 
state level has been successful.218 
                                                          
 211.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 212.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584, 602 (2002). 
 213.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). 
 214.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 
 215.  Such proof to a jury could take place either at trial or a post-conviction proceeding.  See 
United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 514 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.), aff’d and remanded, 543 
U.S. 220 (2004). 
 216.  In Jones v. United States, for example, the district court enhanced the defendants’ sen-
tence for drug distribution on the basis of facts related to the defendants’ drug conspiracy conduct, 
even though the jury acquitted the defendants of the drug conspiracy charge.  135 S. Ct. 8, 8–9 
(2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (expressing concern that the use of ac-
quitted conduct in this fashion violates the Sixth Amendment). 
 217.  See generally United States v. Mateo-Medina, 845 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“[C]alculating a person’s sentence based on crimes for which he or she was not convicted un-
doubtedly undermines the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.”). 
 218.  See Sessions, supra note 60, at 352–53. 
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As this Article’s proposal would comport with the Sixth Amendment, 
it averts the constitutional problem found in Booker, and it can retain the 
binding nature of the original Guidelines.  Sentencing policies that are bind-
ing on judges would reduce disparities,219 the primary goal of having sen-
tencing guidelines in the first place.220 
F.  Appellate Review for Sentences Outside of the 25% Range Would 
Be Meaningful 
Appellate courts can play an important supervisory role in an effective 
sentencing system.  That is, appeals courts can facilitate guidelines compli-
ance and sentencing consistency by reversing improper sentencing deci-
sions and even by the mere threat of reversal.221  For appeals courts to effec-
tively induce compliance and reduce disparities, however, appellate review 
must have some teeth.  As noted above, appellate review under the current 
Guidelines system is modest.222 
This Article contemplates that sentences issued within the 25% range 
would be reviewable only for very limited reasons: to ensure that judges 
referenced the correct statutory grade; that judges used aggravating and mit-
igating factors only from the prescribed list; and that judges otherwise com-
plied with statutory and constitutional commands.  In addition to these 
technical questions, an appellate court also could inquire as to whether the 
district court’s sentence is consistent with the purposes of punishment, as 
explained in infra Part IV.E. 
If a sentence is imposed outside of the 25% range, however, this Arti-
cle envisions that appellate review would be robust.  In particular, for these 
departures, appellate courts would ask, in addition to the aforementioned 
questions, whether there is a sufficient basis in evidence for the sentencing 
court’s determination that a factor is present to an unusual degree to warrant 
a departure.223  The onus would be on the judge to justify, on the record, the 
basis for the departure and the appellate review of these out-of-range sen-
tences would be anything but a rubberstamp.224 
                                                          
 219.  See supra Part III.E.  
 220.  See supra note 36. 
 221.  See Stephanos Bibas et al., Essay, Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
1371, 1371 (2009). 
 222.  See supra Part III.F. 
 223.  Cf. Judge Pryor’s Response, supra note 63, at 278-79 (calling for “presumptive” guide-
lines in which a sentencing judge would need a “substantial and compelling” reason to depart). 
 224.  Cf. id. at 279 (proposing that appellate review “not only would assure correct calculations 
of the guidelines and promote consistency in their application but also would assure that down-
ward departures did not occur without substantial and compelling reasons.”). 
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G.  The Purposes of Punishment Would Be Coordinated 
The original Commission ran out of time to pursue a multipurpose 
Guidelines system and, for expedient and political reasons, opted for a 
Guidelines system based on past practice.225  This Article seeks to accom-
plish what the initial Commission failed to do: develop a hybrid approach to 
sentencing that gives meaning to each of the traditional reasons for punish-
ment.226  This subpart spells out the specific roles retribution, rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, and deterrence play in the Article’s proposed sentencing 
model. 
1.  Retribution 
The grade of the offense is the first factor for judges to consider in the 
sentencing process.  The grade signals Congress’s view as to the serious-
ness of the offense,227 and offense seriousness corresponds with the retribu-
tive purpose of punishment.228 
A recent amendment to the Model Penal Code affirms that retribution 
supplies the primary justification for modern sentencing.229  The Model Pe-
nal Code identifies retributive considerations— “the gravity of offenses, the 
harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders”—as 
the primary justification for punishment.230  The American Law Institute’s 
(“ALI”) effort to coordinate the reasons for punishment is especially re-
markable because this specific amendment was the ALI’s first amendment 
to the Model Penal Code in almost fifty years.231 
Even though our criminal justice system is predicated on retributive 
considerations, retribution cannot operate on its own.  For starters, neither 
Congress232 nor the Commission233 has selected retribution as the sole pur-
pose of federal punishment. 
                                                          
 225.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 226.  See Nagel, supra note 51, at 918 (asserting “[t]he Commission planned to create guide-
lines “consistent with the statutory mandate for a multipurpose amalgam”). 
 227.  See SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 51. 
 228.  See Joshua Dressler, The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day Criminal Sentencing, 38 
AKRON L. REV. 853, 860 (2005). 
 229.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  This Article’s endorsement of retribution is supported by recent research suggesting that 
retribution can reflect community views of the seriousness of punishment, can thereby bring moral 
credibility to punishment, and can thereby further crime control considerations.  See Paul H. Rob-
inson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility, and the Challenge of Social Change, 111 
NW. U. L. REV. 1565 (2017). 
 232.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012) (listing the purposes of punishment on an equal basis).  
 233.  See Breyer, supra note 54, at 17; Nagel, supra note 51, at 930–31. 
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In addition, the Nation’s experience with retribution indicates that it 
cannot alone dictate sentencing outcomes.  At present, punishment is large-
ly retributive: offenders encounter long sentences, are effectively ware-
housed, and are provided with little support to improve their capacity to live 
within the bounds of the law upon release.234  As a result, the criminogenic 
needs of inmates are allowed to fester, inmates are left further unprepared 
for productive living in society, and they are more inclined to return to lives 
of criminality.235  To make matters worse, supervised release similarly tends 
to focus on revocation of probationary status as opposed to supporting the 
ex-inmate.236 
Data bears out this reality in striking terms.  Almost all inmates in fed-
eral custody will be released back into their communities.237  Of these re-
                                                          
 234.  See Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977) (“Persons are sent to prison 
as punishment, not for punishment.” ); Obama, supra note 79, at 812 (“[Our criminal justice sys-
tem] takes young people who made mistakes no worse than my own and traps them in an endless 
cycle of marginalization and punishment.”); J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive Coma, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 829, 841–42 (2002) (“Contemporary prison policy, freed of its commitment to 
rehabilitation, either emphasizes retribution, reinvigorating such archaic practices as chain gangs 
and public shaming, or emphasizes no-frills incapacitation. . . .  [W]e simply warehouse our incar-
cerated population.” (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (citing Rick Bragg, Chain Gangs to 
Return to Roads of Alabama, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at 7; Mireya Navarro, Florida Prisons to 
Revive Using Chain Gangs—But with Limits, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 21, 1995, at A7)); James M. 
Byrne, A Review of the Evidence on the Effectiveness of Alternative Sanctions and an Assess-
ment of the Likely Impact of Federal Sentencing Guideline Reform on Public Safety: Summary of 
Testimony 19 (July 10, 2009), http://faculty.uml.edu/jbyrne/documents/A-Review-of-the-
Evidence-on-the-Effectiveness-of-Alternative-Sanctions-and-an-Assessment-of-.pdf. (“[T]here is 
no methodologically rigorous evidence that incarceration reduces an offender’s risk of re-
offending upon return to the community; in fact . . . prisoners actually re-offend at a higher rate.”).   
The retributive nature of prison is exemplified by attitudes towards prison rape.  Some are 
indifferent to, or even accepting of, prison rape on the ground that inmates “deserve” to be raped.  
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW PANEL ON PRISON RAPE, REPORT ON SEXUAL 
VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS 48 n.494 (G. J. Mazza ed., 2012), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reviewpanel/pdfs/prea_finalreport_2012.pdf (“National studies have 
found that a significant number of correctional officers believe that homosexual inmates should 
not be protected from rape or that if homosexual inmates are raped, they got what they de-
served.”). 
 235.  Contributing to the retributive way in which inmates serve their punishment is the pub-
lic’s ability or preference to disassociate itself from inmates.  See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 
152 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]e should have a realistic conception of the 
composition of the prison and jail population before deciding that they are a scum entitled to noth-
ing better than what a vengeful populace and a resource-starved penal system choose to give them.  
We must not exaggerate the distance between ‘us,’ the lawful ones, the respectable ones, and the 
prison and jail population; for such exaggeration will make it too easy for us to deny that popula-
tion the rudiments of humane consideration.”). 
 236.  See Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 
REV. RES. 479, 508 (1999) (“[P]arole supervision has been transformed ideologically from a so-
cial service to a law enforcement system.  Just as the prison system responded to the public’s de-
mands for accountability and justice, so did parole officers.”). 
 237.  Of the 171,491 federal inmates, only 4,792 (or 2.79%) were sentenced to life or death.  
Sentences Imposed, FED. BUR. PRISONS, 
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leased inmates, a significant number of ex-offenders recidivate, or break the 
law again and impose new harms on new victims.  In a comprehensive 
study, the Commission found that, of 25,431 federal offenders released 
from prison in 2005, almost half were rearrested and almost a third were re-
convicted; most recidivated within just two years of release.238 
A purely retributive system would tolerate, if not facilitate, these post-
release harms.  Society pays for a purely retributive system both in terms of 
suffering additional injuries and incurring additional expenditures when the 
offender invariably revolves back into the criminal justice system.239  If so-
ciety has an interest in reducing the likelihood of subsequent harm and pro-
tecting potential victims,240 it cannot concern itself only with punishing the 
offender for what they did in the past.241  As one judge put it, a sentencing 
“judge cannot close his or her eyes” to how punishment is carried out.242  
Instead, the judge has a “responsibility and power to ensure that the sen-
tence is carried out in a civilized way.”243 
2.  Rehabilitation 
A sovereign cannot, at sentencing, go back in time to change the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the criminal behavior.244  But with an offender in 
its custody, the state does have the opportunity to ensure that the program-
matic needs of the offender are addressed such that the offender can stand a 
                                                          
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_sentences.jsp (last updated Jan. 27, 2018).  
In other words, 97.21% of federal inmates can return to society. 
 238.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW 5 (2016).  
 239.  See generally Brad Parks, How to Fix America’s Mass Incarceration Problem, N.Y. 
POST (Nov. 1, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/11/01/how-to-fix-americas-mass-
incarceration-problem (explaining how the attitude that a criminal deserves to do his or her time, 
without thinking about his or her reentry, “really just shoots all of society in the foot.” (quoting 
Shadd Maruna, Dean of the Rutgers School of Criminal Justice)). 
 240.  See Wilkins et al., supra note 76, at 305 (“In the 1970’s, members of the public and Con-
gress denounced the ineffectiveness of the ‘revolving-door’ criminal justice system.  Offenders 
often were incarcerated, deemed rehabilitated, and released only to start the cycle anew.”); see 
also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (identifying “a concern for the safety and 
indeed the lives of its citizens” as a “primary concern of every government”); id. at 750 (identify-
ing “the Government’s general interest in preventing crime” as “compelling”). 
 241.  See United States v. D.W., 198 F. Supp. 3d 18, 23 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Sentencing is not 
merely an announcement of judgment.  It is a prediction and assumption of how the sentence will 
be carried out.”). 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. at 146.  
 244.  See Alan Feuer, Federal Judge Urges U.S. to ‘Jettison the Madness of Mass Incarcera-
tion’, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/nyregion/federal-judge-
urges-us-to-jettison-the-madness-of-mass-incarceration.html (“So many defendants I see are with-
out schooling, skills, hope or direction, and no term of years is going to change that.” (quoting 
United States District Judge Raymond J. Dearie)). 
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better chance of living crime-free once released.  As one United States At-
torney noted, “[w]e can look at ex-offenders returning to our communities 
as a risk, or we can help give them that chance.  The potential rewards for 
their lives, for the economy and for our safety are incalculable.”245 
A sentence, therefore, should be designed to successfully reintegrate 
the offender into society.246  Accordingly, punishment should entail not on-
ly the withdrawal of the offender’s liberty, but also a practical imperative to 
mitigate future harm.  This may be furthered by providing offenders with 
proven methods, such as mental health services, educational instruction, 
skills training, and mentorship.247  Proven methods are those rehabilitative 
programs based in evidence248 and shown to reduce the likelihood of recidi-
vism.249  Methods that have the opposite effect should be scrapped.250  This 
                                                          
 245.  Paul J. Fishman, Ex-Offenders Get Time, Now They Need Opportunity, NJ.COM (July 16, 
2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/07/post_24.html.  
 246.  The societal interest in the offender’s success does not end at release.  Former Treasury 
Secretary Robert Rubin offers a useful five-point blueprint to enhance the offender’s prospects for 
a post-release, crime-free life.  See Robert E. Rubin, The Smart Way to Help Ex-Convicts, and 
Society, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opinion/how-to-make-
mass-incarceration-end-for-good.html.  Secretary Rubin’s proposal should be contrasted with the 
current system in which an ex-offender is given very little support.  See id. (“How is giving a for-
mer inmate $200 and not much else—no suitable place to live, no help finding work, no help ad-
justing to life outside prison walls—preparing him for a productive life?”).  
 247.  As the head of one re-entry organization notes, “[a]n investment in people, even formerly 
incarcerated individuals, offers such a great return in a variety of places, from a public safety as-
pect . . . .  They can earn money and in turn start paying taxes and give back to a community.  
They can get engaged with their children and break that cycle of crime.”  Jim Barnes, Reentry 
Groups Invest in Ex-Inmates to Break the Cycle of Crime, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/reentry-groups-invest-in-ex-inmates-to-break-the-cycle-
of-crime/2016/03/01/ce27c0c0-db11-11e5-891a-4ed04f4213e8_story.html (quoting Derwin Over-
ton, Executive Director of Opportunities, Alternatives and Resources).  Further, inmates have sig-
nificant mental health needs.  See Obama, supra note 79, at 849 (“Nationwide, slightly more than 
one in twenty individuals have some form of mental illness.  In 2005, more than half of the incar-
cerated population did.”). 
 248.  See Colleen Walsh, The Costs of Inequality: A Goal of Justice, a Reality of Unfairness, 
HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 29, 2016), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/02/the-costs-of-
inequality-a-goal-of-justice-a-reality-of-unfairness/ (“The disparity concerns of 20 years ago were 
not illegitimate, but the way to deal with disparity in sentencing is by coming up with programs 
that we have validated and tested, programs that we have legitimized . . . .  Going forward, we 
have to look at things differently.”(quoting retired United States District Judge Nancy Gertner)). 
 249.  In one of his last opinions as a United States District Judge, John Gleeson provided an 
example of an offender who successfully completed a “no-entry” court for a drug trafficking of-
fense, and in doing so avoided prison, avoided a felony record and the collateral consequences of 
that record, and avoided imposing significant financial costs on the system.  United States v. 
Dokmeci, No. 13-CR-00455 (JG), 2016 WL 915185, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2016). 
 250.  To fulfill the objective of preparing inmates for a lawful post-release existence, the crim-
inal justice system, including prisons, may need to curb if not eliminate practices, such as solitary 
confinement, that may tend to calcify criminogenic qualities or push the inmate further away from 
social situations that would otherwise facilitate a healthy and sustained transition into his or her 
community.  See generally Alex Kozinski, Worse than Death, 125 YALE L.J. F. 230, 231–35 
(2016) (describing the effects of solitary confinement); Kevin Johnson, More Than a Decade After 
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is not an aspirational, idealistic possibility: proven models already exist at 
state and local levels, and even internationally,251 for supportive incarcera-
tion that yields decreased recidivism, and does so at lower costs.252  Federal 
sentencing should take its cue from these demonstrably effective pro-
grams.253  As then-President Obama stated in his much-discussed Harvard 
Law Review article, “inmates who participate in correctional education pro-
grams have significantly lower odds of returning to prison than those who 
                                                          
Release, They All Come Back, USA TODAY (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/11/04/solitary-confinement-prisoners-
impact/73830286/ (tracking nine offenders subject to solitary confinement, all of whom recidivat-
ed and returned to prison).  
 251.  See Nicholas Turner & John Wetzel, Opinion, Treating Prisoners with Dignity Can Re-
duce Crime, NAT’L J. (May 22, 2014), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/57245; Keramet Reiter 
et al., Denmark Doesn’t Treat Its Prisoners Like Prisoners—and It’s Good for Everyone, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/02/denmark-
doesnt-treat-its-prisoners-like-prisoners-and-its-good-for-everyone/ (“Recidivism is . . .  relatively 
low among released Danish prisoners, hovering around 27 percent, half of the average recidivism 
rates reported across various U.S. jurisdictions.”); Nicholas Turner & Jeremy Travis, What We 
Learned from German Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/opinion/what-we-learned-from-german-prisons.html; 60 
Minutes: Privacy, Weekend Leave, Keys . . . This Is Prison? (CBS television broadcast Apr. 3, 
2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-germany-prisons-crime-and-punishment. 
 252.  See, e.g., LOIS M. DAVIS ET AL., RAND CORP., EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
CORRECTIONAL EDUCATION: A META-ANALYSIS OF PROGRAMS THAT PROVIDE EDUCATION TO 
INCARCERATED ADULTS xvi (2013) (finding that educational programming resulted in a 43% re-
duction in recidivism); Stephen J. Steurer & Linda G. Smith, Education Reduces Crime: Three-
State Recidivism Study Executive Summary, CORRECTIONAL EDUC. ASS’N (Feb. 2003), 
http://www.ceanational.org/PDFs/EdReducesCrime.pdf (reporting a 37.8% reduction in recidi-
vism for program participants); Office of Justice Programs, Program Profile: Project BUILD, 
NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Dec. 30, 2013), 
https://www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=335 (examining an education-focused 
program with a 24% reduction in recidivism); Office of Justice Programs, Practice Profile: Incar-
ceration-Based Therapeutic Communities for Adults, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
https://www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails.aspx?ID=52 (last visited Oct. 2, 2017) (analyzing 
a substance abuse program in which participants are 1.38 times less likely to recidivate); see also 
Rachel E. Barkow, Life Without Parole and the Hope for Real Sentencing Reform, in LIFE 
WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 190, 199 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Aus-
tin Sarat eds., 2012) (“[T]he consensus now seems to be that while certain treatments (either alone 
or in combination) lower rates of recidivism, recidivism remains relatively high even after treat-
ment.”); Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A 
Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 297, 303 tbl.2 (2007) (including stud-
ies suggesting that rehabilitation can reduce recidivism). 
 253.  The federal approach is in need of improvement.  See DAVID RAUMA, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., EVALUATION OF A FEDERAL REENTRY PROGRAM MODEL 2, 36–37 (2016) (showing no sta-
tistical difference in recidivism rates between inmates who participated in a reentry program and 
those who did not).  The federal system can draw on successful models, avoiding those that do not 
work.  See, e.g., Corinne Ramey, As Boot-Camp Prisons Fade, New York Inmates March On, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/boot-camp-prison-find-their-time-
running-out-1469979345 (stating that boot-camp prisons have “no notable impact on recidivism”). 
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do not, and that every dollar spent on prison education saves four to five 
dollars on the cost of reincarceration.”254 
As an offender’s sentence should be calculated to assist the offender’s 
return to society without imposing additional harms on new victims, some 
may object to this revitalized focus on rehabilitation because of the view, 
grounded in past experiences, that rehabilitation does not work.255  It is be-
cause of this same perception that critics may not have confidence that pro-
grammatic efforts can do anything to reduce recidivism rates.  It is true that 
rehabilitation, while once prominent in the American criminal justice sys-
tem, has faded as a core purpose of punishment in federal law.256  It also is 
true that the framers of the SRA were highly skeptical of rehabilitation.257  
But rehabilitation remains a codified purpose of punishment,258 and recent 
rehabilitative efforts suggest that carefully tailored rehabilitative efforts can 
demonstrably reduce recidivism rates.259  If the objectives of the criminal 
justice system include the reduction of future harm and ensuring that of-
fenders leave the criminal justice system without reoffending, these recent 
efforts, and therefore rehabilitation in general, cannot be cast aside whole-
sale due to historic underperformance.260 
At a deeper level, this Article is unprepared to dismiss all offenders as 
beyond improvement.261  As Justice Anthony Kennedy has stated, we must 
“bridge the gap between proper skepticism about rehabilitation on the one 
hand and improper refusal to acknowledge that the more than two million 
                                                          
 254.  Obama, supra note 79, at 831–32. 
 255.  See Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 
PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974) (“With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have 
been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.”); Nagel, supra note 51, at 928 
n.237.  
 256.  See Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 324 (2011). 
 257.  See SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 38 (calling rehabilitation an “outmoded” 
model of criminal justice); id. (“[A]lmost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now 
doubts that rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting, and it is now quite certain 
that no one can really detect whether or when a prisoner is rehabilitated.”); see also Sharon M. 
Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Philosophi-
cal Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 951 (1995) (“The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform 
Act . . . reveals the abandonment of the rehabilitative model in favor of the just deserts philoso-
phy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 258.  See United States v. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“With the advent 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines it has been argued that rehabilitation has a subsidiary role 
compared to deterrence and just desert punishment as rationales for sentencing. . . .  This view is 
mistaken.  Rehabilitation is still a fundamental consideration for federal sentencing . . . .” (citation 
omitted) (citing Bunzel, supra note 257, at 951))). 
 259.  See supra note 252.  
 260.  See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011 (1991). 
 261.  Cf. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (holding that life without pa-
role for juvenile offenders ignores the capacity of juveniles to change and is appropriate only for 
those “who have shown an inability to reform”).   
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inmates in the United States are human beings whose minds and spirits we 
must try to reach.”262  Then-Judge Alex Kozinski similarly shared his view 
that offenders are not “inevitably evil” or “forever evil,” lamenting that this 
perspective “seems to be dwindling.”263 
Some also may charge that this Article would dramatically rework the 
current operation of federal prisons.  But the notion that we should pay 
greater attention to the manner of incarceration is not new or novel.264  Oth-
ers have argued that American prisons can change if they are properly in-
centivized to provide programmatic support in order to reduce recidi-
vism.265  In 2016, the Department of Justice took note, proposing that, 
“[u]pon incarceration, every inmate should be provided an individualized 
reentry plan tailored to his or her risk of recidivism and programmatic 
needs.”266  Also, according to the Department, “[w]hile incarcerated, each 
inmate should be provided education, employment training, life skills, sub-
stance abuse, mental health, and other programs that target their crimino-
genic needs and maximize their likelihood of success upon release.”267  
These principles, if implemented, would require adjustments as to how fed-
eral prisons operate.268 
How would retribution mesh with rehabilitation, as both seem at odds?  
This Article recognizes retribution as the leading reason for why we punish, 
but rehabilitation as the leading reason for how we punish.  Indeed, an in-
mate shall not be released until an official determination is made that the 
                                                          
 262.  Justice Kennedy’s Speech, supra note 81. 
 263.  Charles Koch Institute, Is There Room For Forgiveness in Criminal Justice?, YOUTUBE 
(Nov. 11, 2015), https://youtu.be/icUPo-7pUDc.  
 264.  See Justice Kennedy’s Speech, supra note 81.  As Justice Kennedy explained, 
The focus of the legal profession, perhaps even the obsessive focus, has been on the 
process for determining guilt or innocence.  When someone has been judged guilty and 
the appellate and collateral review process has ended, the legal profession seems to lose 
all interest.  When the prisoner is taken away, our attention turns to the next case.  
When the door is locked against the prisoner, we do not think about what is behind it. 
Id.; see Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977) (“It is incumbent on the incarcerat-
ing body to provide the individual with a healthy habilitative environment.  Anything less would 
be to subject the individual to further punishment than was given by the sentencing trial court.”). 
 265.  See, e.g., Kenneth L. Avio, On Private Prisons: An Economic Analysis of the Model Con-
tract and Model Statute for Private Incarceration, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 265 (1991); Francis T. Cullen et al., The Accountable Prison, 28 J. CONTEMP. 
CRIM. JUST. 77 (2012); Alexander Volokh, Prison Accountability and Performance Measures, 63 
EMORY L.J. 339 (2013).  
 266.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ROADMAP TO REENTRY: REDUCING RECIDIVISM THROUGH 
REENTRY REFORMS AT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 3 (2016) (emphasis omitted), 
https://www.justice.gov/reentry/file/844356/download. 
 267.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 268.  See supra notes 266–267 and accompanying text. 
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offender can live in mainstream society on a lawful basis.269  This require-
ment takes seriously the interest in reducing additional harms and incentiv-
izes offender compliance with the provided plan.  As one federal district 
court judge has argued, federal inmates are not incentivized “to take ad-
vantage of work or study opportunities” in the current prison system.270 
A structural change would help promote the rehabilitative way in 
which punishment would be carried out.  To further the rehabilitative exe-
cution of punishment, the Bureau of Prisons, which administers the federal 
prisons, should be extracted from the Department of Justice.  This is for at 
least two reasons.  First, it may not be sensible for the Bureau of Prisons to 
operate within the same administrative culture as Department prosecutors, 
whose interests are served through longer sentences in harsher conditions of 
confinement.271  Second, the results of a punitive approach, with little ap-
parent interest in ensuring that inmates are prepared for post-release life, are 
high recidivism rates, additional crime, and additional expenditures to pros-
ecute and punish secondary harms. 
If the Bureau of Prisons were to be taken out of the Department of Jus-
tice, the question becomes: Where should it be placed?  An answer may be 
the federal judiciary.  For starters, the Sentencing Commission is an inde-
pendent agency within the federal judiciary.  The Supreme Court blessed 
Congress’s creation of this agency in the federal courts.272  Just as the 
Commission sets sentencing policy for federal judges, the United States 
Corrections Commission could set corrections policy for the institutions to 
which federal judges remand federal inmates.  This expert body may help 
ensure that inmates are provided with evidence-based rehabilitative pro-
                                                          
 269.  See United States Parole Comm’n Manual, 28 C.F.R § 2.18 (2016) (explaining that pa-
role will be granted if “release would not jeopardize the public welfare (i.e., that there is a reason-
able probability that, if released, the prisoner would live and remain at liberty without violating 
the law or the conditions of his parole).”). 
 270.  Stefan R. Underhill, Did the Man I Sentenced to 18 Years Deserve It?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/opinion/sunday/did-i-sentence-a-murderer-or-a-
cooperative-witness.html. 
 271.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Depart-
ment of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 320 (2013).  Barkow writes: 
The BOP is poorly positioned to be an independent voice on corrections because its of-
ficials must speak through DOJ, which deemphasizes corrections concerns, including 
rehabilitation and reentry, in favor of prosecutors' interests, which are to maintain long-
er sentences on the books and sufficiently harsh conditions of confinement so that pros-
ecutors maintain the bargaining leverage that allows them to obtain pleas so easily. . . .  
Prosecutors care more about how punishment can help them win cases and be used to 
lock up people they view as dangerous.  They are institutionally poorly situated to think 
about what happens after someone is sentenced and what inmates need to reenter socie-
ty when that sentence is up. 
Id. 
 272.  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989). 
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gramming calculated to ensure inmates’ successful transition to life outside 
of prison.  The federal judiciary already encompasses other actors in the 
sentencing and corrections arena, including judges (of course) and proba-
tion officers, who prepare PSRs and monitor inmates’ compliance with 
conditions of supervised release.  As federal judicial actors are involved in 
incarceration at the front-end sentencing phase and the back-end post-
release phase, federal judicial actors may be involved in the middle phase of 
custody as well. 
3.  Incapacitation 
Should an inmate remain in custody beyond any time justified by re-
tributive purposes, the duration of the inmate’s sentence would be justified 
by a need to incapacitate the offender, that is, to keep them from society.  
An offender in this situation has failed to internalize programmatic support 
such that they cannot return to society without posing an unacceptable risk 
of recidivism and posing a threat to public safety.  To be sure, such post-
retributive custody may, but need not, take place in prison.  Depending on 
the circumstances of the offender and, in particular, the degree to which the 
offender is prepared to live crime-free in society, the offender may be 
placed in alternative correctional settings. 
While this Article accepts the finding of the Model Penal Code 
(“Code”) that retribution is the leading purpose of punishment, this Article 
does depart from the Code in another respect.  The Code requires utilitarian 
considerations to be deployed within the bounds of retributive considera-
tions.273  This Article, by contrast, permits an offender to be punished be-
yond what is justified on retributive grounds if the offender is not prepared 
for release back into the community.  That is, under this Article, after the 
point at which punishment can no longer be supported on the basis of the 
offender’s desert, an offender could still be incapacitated.  In this Article’s 
view, it is better to ensure, as a practical matter, that the offender is able to 
return to society without re-offending and thus introducing additional costs 
to society, than to ensure, as a formal matter, that retribution governs other 
sentencing goals. 
4.  Deterrence 
This leaves deterrence, both specific and general.  Deterrence remains 
a legitimate purpose of punishment, one that continues to enjoy codified 
status.274  There are, however, two major issues with respect to the mean-
ingful incorporation of deterrence in a sentencing scheme. 
                                                          
 273.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(a)(ii) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 274.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
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Deterrence is the prospective offender and society’s assessment of the 
cost of criminal behavior.275  That is, under deterrence theory, the prospec-
tive criminal will consider the gains of criminal behavior against the proba-
bility of punishment; the latter should outweigh the former and, thus, dis-
suade the prospective offender and other individuals from pursuing the 
contemplated criminal action.276  As scholars have recognized, deterrence 
involves much more than a simple binary assessment of potential rewards 
against potential punishment.  Under more developed notions of deterrence, 
a prospective criminal will consider possible gains against the combined 
probabilities of four countervailing factors: the probability of detection, the 
probability of prosecution, the probability of conviction, and the probability 
of punishment.277 
The first relevant problem with respect to deterrence is that a sentenc-
ing judge can realistically impact only one of the four probabilities cutting 
against criminality, that is, the probability of punishment.278  The second 
problem is that, even with respect to the limited factor of probability of 
punishment, the deterrent effect of sentences is very much in doubt.279  
What is well-established is that any deterrent effect of punishment fades 
over time because individuals focus more on the immediate loss of liberty 
than the loss of liberty down the road.280  Put simply by Third Circuit Judge 
Stephanos Bibas, “a day of freedom today is worth more than a day of free-
dom ten years from now.”281 
                                                          
 275.  See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2387 (1997) 
(“[C]riminal law can be seen as setting prices for crimes.”). 
 276.  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 176 (1968) (“[W]hen other variables are held constant, an increase in a person’s probability 
of conviction or punishment if convicted would generally decrease . . . the number of offenses he 
commits.”). 
 277.  See Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alter-
natives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2211 (1999). 
 278.  See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 111, at 220 (concluding that it would be unworkable 
for judges to take account of each of these probabilities, “however persuasive or noble the theory 
of optimal penalties was in the abstract”). 
 279.  Compare ROGER K. WARREN, CRIME & JUSTICE INST., NAT’L INST. OF CORR. & NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EVIDENCE–BASED PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR STATE JUDICIARIES 11 (2007) (“[I]ncarceration actually results in slightly increased rates of 
offender recidivism.”), with Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty–First Century, 42 CRIME 
& JUST. 199, 231 (2013) (“[U]nlike increments in long sentences, increments in short sentences 
do have a material deterrent effect on a crime-prone population.”). 
 280.  See Nagin, supra note 279, at 201 (“[T]here is little evidence that increases in the length 
of already long prison sentences yield general deterrent effects that are sufficiently large to justify 
their social and economic costs.”); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, 
and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1567–68 (1998) (“If the sentence is already long, any in-
crements of length will have little weight in the criminal’s calculations . . . .”).  
 281.  Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2464, 2504 (2004). 
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In consideration of the dubious status of deterrence, reflected in the 
two problems identified in modern deterrence theory, this Article does not 
assign an independent role to deterrence.  But, because of the discounting of 
punishment over time, this Article assumes that any deterrent effect would 
be subsumed under punishments that would be justified on retributive 
grounds. 
Prior to the Guidelines, an individual convicted of a federal offense 
could serve substantially less time than the imposed sentence.282  If, for ex-
ample, a defendant was sentenced to ten years in prison, the offender, the 
victim(s), and society would rightly expect the offender to be put away for 
roughly the sentenced term.  But, with parole, the offender may be freed in 
five years.  The sense, therefore, was that everyone, especially the victim, 
was duped by the sentence and the system in general. 
The Guidelines promote “truth in sentencing,” or the assurance at the 
time of sentencing that the offender will serve the sentence imposed.283  The 
Guidelines did so by abolishing parole.  In the Guidelines era, a victim and 
society know that a ten-year sentence effectively means the inmate will 
serve ten years.  There is one exception: to incentivize compliance with 
prison regulations, an inmate can shave a maximum of fifteen percent off of 
his or her sentence for “good behavior.”284 
This Article acknowledges the benefit of certain-sentencing for victims 
and others.  But doing away with parole—basically doing away with ensur-
ing that the offender is prepared to be reintegrated into society—is not the 
answer.  In a determinate sentencing system, a judge imposes a sentence at 
time X, with the sentence to expire at time Y, but the judge at time X does 
not know what shape the defendant will be in at time Y, which may be years 
away.285  The defendant at time Y, as recidivism rates suggest, may not be 
                                                          
 282.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SENTENCING AND TIME 
SERVED 4 tbl.3, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sts.pdf; Nagel, supra note 51, at 884 
(“[S]entences pronounced by the court were, with rare exception, never served: twelve years 
meant four, eighteen meant six, thirty meant ten. . . .  [T]he public and the victim were duped by 
the sham. . . .  Furthermore, [parole] served to perpetuate a system where the judge’s sanction was 
not dispositive.” (footnote omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4163, 4164, 4205 (repealed 1984))). 
 283.  See Feinberg, supra note 36, at 296 (“‘[t]ruth in sentencing’ . . . encompass[es] reform 
initiatives aimed at replacing the indeterminate sentence (and parole release) with determinate 
sentencing.”). 
 284.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2012); see also 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 1A.3.  
 285.  See The Effect of United States v. Booker on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing 
Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm. 25 (Feb. 15, 2005) (statement of Paul G. Cassell, U.S. District 
J., District of Utah, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah) (“A 
judge cannot say today whether after completing, say, 100 months of his sentence, a defendant 
will have rehabilitated himself to the point where he is no longer a threat to society.”).  Relatedly, 
Judge Posner has pointed out the folly of imposing, at the time of sentencing, conditions of super-
vised release, to be served at the time of release.  See Richard A. Posner, What Is Obviously 
Wrong With the Federal Judiciary, Yet Eminently Curable, Part I, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 187, 193 
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ready to live crime-free in society, but will be released anyway due to the 
premium placed on offenders serving a fixed, certain prison term.  In other 
words, to release the defendant at time Y would further certainty on the 
front end, but would sacrifice public safety on the back end. 
This Article seeks to promote both certainty and public safety.  
Whereas parole in the pre-Guidelines system enabled a defendant to serve 
time shorter than the imposed sentences, under this Article an offender’s 
served sentence would be no less than what retributive considerations 
would justify.  In addition, under this Article, a defendant’s served sentence 
would last until the defendant is ready to return to the community.  Victims 
and society cannot claim to be duped under a scenario in which an offender 
serves a longer sentence than the retributive minimum.286  A sentence re-
flecting retributive considerations combined with determinations that an of-
fender is prepared to live in society should reflect the concerns of victims 
and society, and also further crime control. 
Moreover, to the extent that certainty remains a residual concern, ex-
isting parole guidelines provide definitive timelines for regular parole hear-
ings.287  These periodic reviews obviate the possibility that the inmate will 
languish in prison without proper consideration.  As to who will conduct 
these reviews, a traditional approach would be to entrust parole boards with 
this responsibility, as these boards made parole decisions prior to the abol-
ishment of the practice in the federal system.  An alternative would be to 
draw on the idea of a “second look,” that is, conferring upon the sentencing 
judge the opportunity to assess the offender’s suitability for release.288 
                                                          
(2016) (“Parole was sensibly based on observations of the convicted criminal’s behavior in prison; 
if he behaved himself he could expect a shortened sentence plus a degree of supervision during the 
parole period. Under the regime of supervised release, the judge at sentencing decides what re-
strictions to impose when the inmate is released, yet without having a clear idea of what he’ll be 
like when released, which may not be for many years.”).   
 286.  The uncertainty of release date also impacts inmates.  See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING 
JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 102 (1st ed. 1976) (“[C]onvicted offenders . . . suffer the 
agonies of not knowing how long their punishments will continue.”).  In this Article’s contemplat-
ed system, inmates sentenced to prison will know they will spend at least a defined period of time 
in prison, due to retributive considerations.  Any remaining time beyond this period, justified on 
rehabilitative considerations, lies in the hands of the inmate and particularly their readiness for 
reintegration.  They hold the keys to release.  
 287.  See UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM’N, RULES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL § 2.12 
(providing the rule for initial hearing), § 2.14 (providing the rule for subsequent hearings), § 2.26 
(providing the rule for appeal), § 2.27 (providing the rule for petition for reconsideration).  
 288.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.6 cmt. (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). 
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H.  Statutory Overrides 
The factors in this Article are necessarily subordinate to any statute.289  
In particular, the factors must correspond with the following statutory direc-
tives: 
1.  Enhancements 
First, the SRA requires the Commission to generally ensure a “first of-
fender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise 
serious offense” does not receive a term of imprisonment, and an offender 
who is “convicted of a crime of violence resulting in serious bodily injury” 
does receive a term of imprisonment.290  Congress already has defined a 
“crime of violence.”291  The question becomes: What is an “otherwise seri-
ous offense?” 
An advantage of drawing upon statutory grades is that the response to 
this question can be rather straightforward: there can be no doubt that the 
highest-grade offenses are “serious.”  To the extent that Congress seeks to 
ensure that offenses other than those labeled as Class A justify imprison-
ment, it can revise and add to the list accordingly.292 
Second, the SRA instructs the Commission to ensure that a career of-
fender receives “a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term au-
thorized . . . .”293  Similarly, the Armed Career Criminal Act,294 which spec-
ifies escalating statutory maximums,295 directs the Commission to ensure 
that a “substantial term of imprisonment” is imposed on an offender: (1) 
who has two or more prior felonies committed separately; (2) who commit-
ted the instant offense as part of a criminal livelihood; (3) who had a major 
role in a conspiracy involving racketeering activity; (4) who committed a 
crime of violence while on release pending a felony charge for which they 
were ultimately convicted; and (5) who trafficked a substantial quantity of a 
controlled substance.296  This Article does not define “substantial,” but 
again, the statutory maximum could be the reference point for offenses fall-
ing within one of these qualifying situations. 
                                                          
 289.  See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993). 
 290.  28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (2012). 
 291.  18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012). 
 292.  The SRA contemplates that the statutory classifications would be evolutionary or fluid in 
nature.  See SRA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 87 (“The Committee intends that future leg-
islation creating new federal offenses specify the grade for the offense.”). 
 293.  28 U.S.C. § 994(h); see also 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 4B1.1(a). 
 294.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
 295.  That said, the Armed Career Criminal Act does mandate that sentences for violations of 
the Act be served consecutively, which can significantly enhance the duration of an offender’s 
sentence.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). 
 296.  28 U.S.C. § 994(i). 
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2.  Reductions: Substantial Assistance and Safety Valve 
Congress provided for two major outlets for judges to depart down-
ward from a mandatory minimum.  First, the government may move for a 
sentence below a mandatory minimum to reward the offender’s “substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense.”297  This substantial assistance provision would be 
unaffected by this Article’s model: after the appropriate grade and associat-
ed range are identified, the government may still argue that the offender 
should receive a sentence below the statutory minimum to reflect the of-
fender’s help. 
Second, Congress permitted a judge to impose a sentence below a 
mandatory minimum in a drug trafficking case if the offender satisfies five 
criteria: (1) they have no more than one criminal history point under the 
Guidelines; (2) they did not use or threaten violence, and did not possess a 
firearm or dangerous weapon; (3) death or serious bodily injury did not re-
sult from the offense; (4) they did not hold a major role in the offense and 
were not involved in a continuing criminal conspiracy; and (5) they cooper-
ated.298  The proposal model does not affect criteria two through four, 
which are real offense characteristics, or five, which captures post-offense 
behavior.  The first criterion is slightly impacted: as the model eschews the 
criminal history point system and the criminal history categories, the statu-
tory safety value can apply under the model if the criteria justifying that 
one-point replace the one-point limitation.  Thus the first criterion under the 
model would be, “an offender must not have a prior sentence exceeding six-
ty days.”299 
Accordingly, this Article’s model is consistent with statutory provi-
sions authorizing sentences below mandatory minimums, and accommo-
dates common, accepted reasons for departures below the statutory mini-
mum. 
3.  Reduction: Fast-Track 
A statutorily mandated basis for a downward departure, which does 
not provide relief from a mandatory minimum, is an offender’s participation 
in an “early disposition” program.  In particular, through the enactment of 
the PROTECT Act, Congress directed the Commission to promulgate “a 
policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not more than 4 lev-
els if the Government files a motion for such departure pursuant to an early 
disposition program authorized by the Attorney General and the United 
                                                          
 297.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
 298.  Id. § 3553(f). 
 299.  See 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 4A1.1.  
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States Attorney.”300  The Commission followed suit, copying the four-level 
departure from the directive and pasting it into the Guidelines.301 
This Article adopts, for two reasons, fast-track participation as reason 
to depart from the 25% bottom limit.  First, the downward departure reflects 
the will of Congress.  Second, the fast-track departure is a commonly uti-
lized inducement in illegal reentry cases that promotes judicial efficiency 
and that particularly eases the strain on sentencing courts in border dis-
tricts.302 
A sentencing worksheet may include a section on statutory overrides.  
That separate section may look as follows: 
Statutory Overrides 
The sentence must comply with the following statutory provi-
sions: 
No imprisonment may be imposed on a: 
 First-time offender whose instant offense is not 
 A crime of violence, or an otherwise serious (Grade A) of-
fense303 
A term of imprisonment must be imposed on an: 
 Offender who is convicted of a crime of violence, and 
 That results in serious bodily injury304 
A term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized 
shall be imposed upon a career offender.305 
Enhanced punishment as specified in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (and no 
probation) shall be imposed on an offender who: 
 is convicted of a crime of violence or drug-trafficking offense, 
and  
 uses or carries a firearm or who, in furtherance of any such 
crime, possesses a firearm306 
A substantial term of imprisonment shall be imposed on an of-
fender who: 
 has two or more prior felonies committed separately 
 committed the instant offense as part of a criminal livelihood 
                                                          
 300.  Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675. 
 301.  2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 5K3.1. 
 302.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ILLEGAL REENTRY OFFENSES 7 (2015) (“28.9 percent of 
illegal reentry offenders in fiscal year 2013 received an [early disposition program] departure”). 
 303.  28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (2012); see 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining “crime of violence”). 
 304.  28 U.S.C. § 994(j); see 18 U.S.C. § 16. 
 305.  28 U.S.C. § 994(h); see 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 4B1.1(a) (defining “career of-
fender”). 
 306.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c); id. (defining the scope of “drug-trafficking” offense).  Terms of im-
prisonment for offenses shall run consecutively.  Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). 
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 played a major role in a conspiracy involving racketeering ac-
tivity 
 committed a crime of violence while on release pending a felo-
ny charge for which he was ultimately convicted or 
 trafficked a substantial quantity of a controlled substance307 
A sentence below the statutory minimum is permitted: 
 Upon government motion for  
  The offender’s substantial assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense308 
A sentence below the statutory minimum is permitted if: 
 The offender does not have a prior sentence exceeding sixty 
days309 
 The offender did not use or threaten violence, and did not pos-
sess a firearm or dangerous weapon 
 Death or serious bodily injury did not result 
 The offender did not play a major role in the offense and was 
not involved in a continuing criminal conspiracy, and 
 The offender cooperated310 
A downward departure, for an illegal reentry offense, is permit-
ted: 
 Upon a government motion if 
 The offender participates in an early disposition program311 
I.  Simplicity 
Finally, this Article seeks to respond to concerns that the Guidelines 
are too complex by introducing a more straightforward process and concise 
manual for those involved in sentencing determinations.  In terms of sim-
plicity, the Guidelines have eight chapters and forty-seven parts (not includ-
ing those that have been deleted or not used), some of which have multiple 
subparts.312  In terms of length, the Guidelines boasts 572 pages, whereas 
this entire Article stands at less than one-hundred. 
V. LIMITS 
It is important to acknowledge the limits of this system.  First, this Ar-
ticle does not respond to prosecutorial practices that are said to contribute to 
the severity of federal sentencing and undermine defendants’ rights.  These 
                                                          
 307.  28 U.S.C. § 994(i). 
 308.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
 309.  See 2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 4A1.1. 
 310.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).   
 311.  2016 U.S.S.G., supra note 41, § 5K3.1. 
 312.  Id. at iii–vi.  
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practices include, but are not limited to, the “trial penalty,”313 the purported 
abuse of 28 U.S.C. § 851 to coerce pleas and cooperation,314 and stacking 
counts under 28 U.S.C. § 924(c).315  Nor does this Article directly address 
pleas, despite their increased use and the congressional interest in pleas.316  
The Commission did not completely respond to plea practices either.317  
This Article recognizes that the Department of Justice may independently 
curb prosecutorial discretion insofar as it concerns plea bargaining.318 
Second, this Article focuses on the sentencing policies that may apply 
to individual offenders and does not address policies that would govern 
corporations or organizations.  This is an issue that confounded the original 
Commission,319 and that the Commission initially tabled.320  This Article 
seeks to address individual sentences in light of the problems with individu-
                                                          
 313.  See United States v. Holloway, 68 F. Supp. 3d 310, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The differ-
ence between the sentencing outcome if a defendant accepts the government’s offer of a plea bar-
gain and the outcome if he insists on his right to trial by jury is sometimes referred to as the ‘trial 
penalty.’”).  As an example, a defendant “likely would have been released in 2003 if he had pled 
guilty under the agreement offered by the government[, b]ut he went to trial instead, and now his 
projected release date is March 10, 2045.”  Id.  “Thus, his trial penalty was 42 years in prison.”  
Id.  There is an ongoing debate as to whether, in fact, federal defendants, on average, are worse off 
for declining the plea and proceeding to trial.  Compare id., and Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underes-
timating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the 
Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1243 (2015) (reporting, based on study, that “defendants con-
victed at trial receive sentences that are sixty-four percent longer, on average, than similar defend-
ants who plead guilty to similar crimes”), with David S. Abrams, Putting the Trial Penalty on Tri-
al, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 777, 783 (2013) (“[P]lea bargains actually result in longer sentences than 
trials.”). 
 314.  See United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).  
[T]he government abuses its power to file prior felony information in drug trafficking 
cases. . . . To coerce guilty pleas, and sometimes to coerce cooperation as well, prosecu-
tors routinely threaten ultra-harsh, enhanced mandatory sentences that no one—not 
even the prosecutors themselves—thinks are appropriate.  And to demonstrate to de-
fendants generally that those threats are sincere, prosecutors insist on the imposition of 
the unjust punishments when the threatened defendants refuse to plead guilty. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 315.  See Holloway, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 312 (“Section 924(c) counts are a triple threat.  First, 
they carry mandatory sentences, which by definition take a degree of judging out of sentencing. 
Second, they result in onerous enhancements for ‘second or subsequent [§ 924(c)] convic-
tion[s].’ . . . convictions can occur in the same trial as the first one, as they did here. Third, the 
mandatory sentences required by § 924(c) are also mandatorily consecutive, to one another and to 
all other sentences in the case.” (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(7)(c) (2012))). 
 316.  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E) (2012). 
 317.  1987 U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 1.8. 
 318.  Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr. to All Federal Prosecutors 2 (May 
19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/holder-memo-
charging-sentencing.pdf. 
 319.  See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 111, at 211 (describing this area as “thorny”). 
 320.  See id. at 212. 
 536 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:485 
 
al sentencing and the absence of similar concerns with respect to guidelines 
for organizational offenses.321 
Third, this Article expressly does not deal with the issue of multiple 
counts, which also perplexed the original Commission.322  Instead, this Ar-
ticle leaves it to counsel to address to what extent multiple counts should 
affect an offender’s sentence.  For example, determinations that an offense 
was part of a single course of conduct, and determinations as to whether a 
second count doubles the sentence, are to be influenced by counsel and not 
prescribed here by rule.323 
Fourth, one may point out that, even if this Article offers a useful al-
ternative to the current Guidelines, federal sentencing policy is but a part of 
a larger legal scheme concerning crime and punishment.  Chief among these 
statutes are mandatory minimums and maximums.324  This Article responds 
to the room established within these statutes.  It is true that meaningful 
criminal justice reform will require congressional action, both in terms of 
approving any changes to the Guidelines regime and reconsidering the use 
of mandatory minimums.325 
Fifth, stepping back even further, one may continue that federal sen-
tencing policy is but a part of a much larger social sequence that consists of 
failures in family and community support, educational resources, employ-
ment opportunity, and substance abuse and mental health services, and only 
ends with sentencing.  This Article addresses only the sentencing stage, and 
not the other elements that may lead an individual to interact with the crim-
inal justice system.  To attain a just society, each of the phases prior to sen-
tencing must be tackled. 
VI.  APPLYING THE ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM 
To determine if this proposed alternative system is workable—that is 
to say one that can be administered with some ease and measure of predict-
ability—this Article provides broad sketches of how the system would ap-
ply to four cases.  Some may criticize these simulations and insist instead 
that this Article’s proposed framework be provided to federal judges to ap-
ply to hypothetical cases.  This indeed was the approach taken in the semi-
                                                          
 321.  See id. at 213–14. 
 322.  See Breyer, supra note 54, at 25–26 (describing the multiple count problem as “intracta-
ble” and “complex”).  
 323.  The Guidelines’ approach to grouping multiple counts may be instructive to counsel and 
the courts, see 2016 U.S.S.G., but is not mandated herein.  See supra note 41, § 3D1.2–3. 
 324.  A list of mandatory minimum statutes may be found here: CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING STATUTES 101–16 (2013). 
 325.  See Obama, supra note 79, at 826 (“Any lasting, broad-based reform to federal sentenc-
ing can only be addressed through legislation.”). 
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nal 1974 Second Circuit Sentencing Study that helped make the case for 
federal sentencing reform.326 
The author gave serious consideration to recreating this Second Circuit 
Study by giving this Article’s model to federal judges.  But two points 
counseled against this option.  First, any such experiment would be critical-
ly incomplete.  In asking federal judges to divulge what sentence they 
would impose in the hypothetical cases, the judges would be supplied only 
with a summary of the facts of a case.  Left out would be essential parts of 
the sentencing process, such as counsel arguments and colloquies with the 
offender.  The Second Circuit Study acknowledged this “paper defendant” 
shortcoming and the role that additional information may have on a judge 
imposing an individualized sentence.327   
The second problem, however, convinced the author that involving ac-
tual judges was not prudent.  In particular, the fact remains that judges have 
considerable responsibilities, including sentencing real defendants in actual 
cases.  To generate statistically significant results, at least twenty federal 
judges would have to participate in this experiment.  This means that the 
author would be drawing away the time of a significant number of federal 
judges—this imposition, in the aggregate, is not something that the author 
felt was sufficiently justified, as the hypothetical sentences would bear little 
resemblance to actual sentencing and there are other ways to demonstrate 
how this model works. 
This Article instead utilizes an approach used by an American Bar As-
sociation task force to show how its proposed fraud guideline applies.328  
The task force presented four fact patterns and then walked the reader 
through how the proposed guideline would apply to the four vignettes.  This 
approach has been successful in that the task force’s “shadow guidelines” 
have informed sentences in federal cases,329 and the Commission itself was 
forced to confront that model as a consequence.330  As the ABA’s four cases 
were sufficient to have a meaningful impact on actual cases and on the 
Commission’s deliberations, Part IV.A explains how this Article’s model 
works in four cases.  Part IV.B suggests that the Commission should be au-
thorized to adjust the midpoint of sentences in light of the gap between the 
                                                          
 326.  Second Circuit Sentencing Study, supra note 24, at 2. 
 327.  Id. at 14–16. 
 328.  See A REPORT ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SECTION TASK FORCE ON THE REFORM OF FEDERAL SENTENCING FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES 
(2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/economic_crimes.auth
checkdam.pdf. 
 329.  See, e.g., United States v. Faibish, No. 12-cr-265, slip op. at 6 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2015). 
 330.  See The New York Law Journal Publishes Editorial by Chair Saris, U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/april-14-2016. 
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sentences dictated by this system and sentences currently imposed by feder-
al judges. 
A.  Application 
The four cases that are the subject of this demonstration are the four 
consolidated cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in a 2015 opinion authored by Judge Posner.331  In a 2016 
book, Judge Posner elaborated on these cases in discussing the Sentencing 
Guidelines and his concerns with supervised release.332  Why use these cas-
es?  The reasons are several.  Most importantly, these are actual cases in 
which a real defendant was convicted and sentenced.  Relatedly, employing 
these cases also obviates the need for any hypothetical cases to be invented.  
Moreover, these cases touch various major offense types.  In addition, they 
are unusual in that four separate appeals were consolidated, and thus, con-
sidered together to yield a single opinion.  Thus, there is a continuity of 
consideration and analysis that would not otherwise be present in four sepa-
rate, independently examined sentencing determinations.  Finally, as these 
cases were the subject of an academic book authored by a leading appellate 
judge, the cases already have leapt out of the courtroom into the public 
realm. 
Below is a factual summary of the cases, and an overview of the sen-
tencing determinations under the proposed guideline system. 
1.  United States v. Thompson 
Factual Overview:  
When David Michael Thompson was twenty-three years old, he began 
an online relationship with L.C., then a fourteen-year-old girl.333  The two 
engaged in a sexually explicit online relationship.334  In particular, L.C. sent 
Thompson pictures of her breasts and vagina, he returned pictures of his 
penis, and she masturbated naked while on a video chat with him.335  Sub-
sequently, when L.C. was sixteen years of age, Thompson drove from Cali-
fornia to Ohio to pick up L.C., and planned to drive back to California 
where they both would live.336  After Thompson picked up L.C., the two 
                                                          
 331.  United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 332.  RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 197 (1st 
ed. 2016). 
 333.  Thompson, 777 F.3d at 375. 
 334.  Id. 
 335.   See Brief & Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant David M. Thompson at 3, 
Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (No. 14-1316). 
 336.  Stipulation of Facts at 1, United States v. Thompson, No. 3: 12-CR-30316 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 
18, 2013). 
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spent the night at Thompson’s relative’s home in Indiana.337  While there, 
Thompson and L.C. engaged in sexual intercourse,338 which was legal in 
light of Indiana’s consent age of sixteen.339  After the two had resumed their 
travel to California, Thompson was pulled over by the Illinois State Po-
lice.340  Thompson had with him an iPhone 5 that stored two sexually ex-
plicit pictures of L.C.341 
Sentence Under the Guidelines:  
Thompson was charged with Transportation of Child Pornography in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1).342  Thompson pled guilty to this 
charge, and with a criminal history category of II, the judge determined that 
the Guidelines range was 188–235 months.343  Thompson was sentenced to 
imprisonment for 210 months.344 
Sentencing Under the Article’s Model: 
Offense of Conviction: 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) 
Grade of the Offense: C 
Statutory Range: 10–25 years for Class C felonies.  Under the statute 
of conviction, however, the statutory minimum is 5 years and the statutory 
maximum is 20 years.  Accordingly, the relevant statutory range is 5–20 
years, or 60 to 240 months. 
Midpoint of the Applicable Statutory Range: 150 months 
25% range: 131–169 months 
At this stage, counsel will argue, and the sentencing judge will consid-
er, the applicability and weight of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
from the list provided in this Article.  A positive attribute of this model is 
that the parties will have more of an opportunity to influence sentencing by 
addressing the relevance and meaning of the factors.  Accordingly, it is not 
possible to pinpoint, as with the Guidelines, exactly what the sentence will 
look like; this is not a bug in the model, but an intentional feature of it.  
That said, counsel should be able to forecast, from their understanding of 
the case, which aggravating and mitigating factors may be in play. 
The district court judge sentenced the defendant to 210 months, just 
around the midpoint of the applicable Guidelines range of 188–235 months.  
                                                          
 337.  Id. at 2. 
 338.  Id.; Statement of Facts at 1, United States v. Thompson, No. 13-CR-008 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 
20, 2013). 
 339.  Thompson, 777 F.3d at 375. 
 340.  Stipulation of Facts, supra note 336, at 1–2. 
 341.  Id. at 2. 
 342.  Indictment at 1, Thompson, No. 12-CR-30316 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2012).  
 343.  See Brief & Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant David M. Thompson, su-
pra note 335, at 7. 
 344.  Judgment at 2, Thompson, No. 12-CR-30316-MJR (S.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2014). 
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If a district court judge sentenced the defendant to the midpoint of the range 
under this Article’s proposed system, a sentence of 150 months would be 
appropriate—five years less than the sentence to be imposed under the cur-
rent Guidelines.  This may be a welcomed result, given significant concerns 
that the child pornography guidelines are excessive.345  This is not to sug-
gest that this model adequately addresses the severity concerns with child 
pornography sentencing, but that the model could be a step in the right di-
rection. 
2.  United States v. Ortiz 
Factual Overview:  
Armed with a BB gun, Derek Ortiz robbed a bank of $2,880.346  A 
month later, again armed with a BB gun, Ortiz robbed a different bank of 
$2,615.347  Soon thereafter, Ortiz robbed yet a third bank, accompanied by 
his weapon of choice, this time taking $3,590.348  During the final robbery, 
Ortiz attempted to flee and struck a police vehicle that was in pursuit.349  
Ortiz made out on foot, but was subsequently apprehended and arrested.350  
Ortiz was charged with three counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2113(a).351 
Sentence Under the Guidelines:  
Ortiz pled guilty to all three counts.352  Ortiz stipulated that he commit-
ted four bank robberies in addition to those charged in the indictment.353  
The district court determined that the applicable guidelines range was 108–
                                                          
 345.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION’S 2016 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.28 (2016), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-
sourcebooks/2016/Table28.pdf (noting that 713 out of 1,591 sentences under the child pornogra-
phy guideline were below-guideline sentences); see also United States v. Cruikshank, 667 F. 
Supp. 2d 697, 703 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (“Possessors of child pornography are modern-day un-
touchables. . . . [S]ociety seeks harsh sentences for anyone who participates in this market. . . .  
The resulting punishment under the Guidelines may be . . . a reflection of our visceral reaction to 
these images . . . .”).   
 346.  Brief & Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Derek Ortiz at 3–4, United 
States v. Ortiz, No. 14-1521 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2014). 
 347.  Id. at 3. 
 348.  Id. 
 349.  Id. 
 350.  Id.; see also Brief of the U.S. at 3, Ortiz, No. 14-1521 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014). 
 351.  Indictment, United States v. Ortiz, No. 10-CR-00187 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2010).  Ortiz 
committed similar bank robberies on January 15, 2010, February 4, 2010, February 11, 2010, and 
February 15, 2010, but was only indicted on the January 27, 2010, February 27, 2010, and March 
5, 2010 robberies.  Brief & Required Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Derek Ortiz, supra note 
346, at 3–4; Brief of the U.S., supra note 331, at 3–5. 
 352.  Judgment at 1, Ortiz, No. 10-CR-00187 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2014). 
 353.  Brief of the U.S. at 2, United States v. Ortiz, No. 15-3240 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2016). 
 2018]      THE SECOND FOUNDING OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 541 
 
135 months’ imprisonment.354  He was sentenced to imprisonment for 135 
months for each count, to run concurrently. 
Sentencing Under the Article’s Model: 
Offense of Conviction: 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) 
Grade of the Offense: C 
Statutory Range: 10–25 years for Class C felonies.  Under the statute 
of conviction, however, the statutory maximum is set at 20 years.  Accord-
ingly, the relevant statutory range is 10–20 years, or 120–240 months. 
Midpoint of the Applicable Statutory Range: 180 months 
25% Range: 157–203 months 
Again, counsel will then invoke the limited universe of enumerated 
aggravating and mitigating factors to argue where, within this range, the 
sentence should fall, or to argue that the case is atypical and thus the sen-
tence should fall outside of the specified range.  As the district court judge 
imposed a sentence at the high-end of the Guidelines, a judge going to the 
high-end of this Article’s proposed system would impose a sentence of 203 
months—a significant increase relative to the imposed sentence of 135 
months. 
3.  United States v. Bates 
Factual Overview:  
Over the course of several phone calls, Charles Bates and Edward Par-
ker arranged to meet at a residence, where Parker would deliver cocaine to 
Bates.355  Bates subsequently pulled up to the agreed-upon residence in his 
vehicle, Parker then entered the front seat of Bates’ vehicle and handed 
Bates crack cocaine.356  Bates was charged with two counts of intentional 
possession with intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and two counts of using a communi-
cation device to facilitate the commission of a felony in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 843(b).357  Bates pled guilty to one count of possession with intent 
to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base, with the remain-
ing counts dismissed.358 
Sentence Under the Guidelines:  
                                                          
 354.  Id. at 4.  
 355.  Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1–2, United States v. Bates, No. 12-CR-
00700 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2014). 
 356.  Id. at 2. 
 357.  Indictment, Bates, No. 12-CR-00700 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2012). 
 358.  Judgment at 1, Bates, No. 12-CR-00700 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014). 
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As Bates was subject to the career offender enhancement and as he al-
so accepted responsibility, his Guidelines’ range was 262–327 months.359  
Bates received a below-Guidelines sentence of 188 months of imprison-
ment.360  Defense counsel had “stressed defendant’s history of substance 
abuse, arguing that it had contributed substantially to defendant’s instant 
and prior crimes, and also argued that application of the career offender 
guideline overstated the seriousness of his past criminal conduct.”361 
Sentencing Under the Article’s Model: 
Offense of Conviction: 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 
Grade of the Offense: B 
Statutory Range: 25–61 years.  Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), how-
ever, the statutory minimum penalty is set at 5 years and the statutory max-
imum is set at 40 years.  Accordingly, the relevant statutory range is 5–40 
years, or 60 to 480 months. 
Midpoint of the Applicable Statutory Range: 210 months 
25% Range: 184–236 months 
Again, counsel will invoke the limited universe of enumerated aggra-
vating and mitigating factors to argue where, within this range, the sentence 
should fall, or to argue that the case is atypical and thus the sentence should 
fall outside of the specified range.  Here, the Guidelines’ range was 262–
327 months and the range under the proposed model is 184–236 months.  
The district court judge felt the need to impose a below-Guidelines sentence 
of 188 months in light of mitigating circumstances.  A sentence of 188 
months would fall within the range of the proposed model and would be at 
the low end of the range, thus reflecting the mitigating circumstances rec-
ognized by the judge. 
4.  United States v. Blount 
Factual Overview: 
Between March 2010 and June 2011, Domingo Blount, with the assis-
tance of several other individuals, ran a heroin distribution organization that 
operated in Illinois and Ohio.362  Through this operation, Blount and others 
distributed multi-kilogram quantities of heroin in Chicago and Cincinnati.363  
                                                          
 359.  Brief & Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Charles Bates at 4–5, United 
States v. Bates, No. 14-1676 (7th Cir. July 25, 2014); Brief of the U.S. at 4, Bates, No. 14-1676 
(7th Cir. Oct. 3, 2014). 
 360.  Brief & Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Charles Bates, supra note 359, 
at 7. 
 361.  Brief of the U.S., supra note 359, at 4–5. 
 362.  Brief & Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Domingo Blount at 3–4, Unit-
ed States v. Blount, No. 14-1772 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2014). 
 363.  Id. 
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To do so, Blount worked with brokers to purchase the heroin, and then 
worked with mid-level distributors to resell the heroin to others.364  Blount 
also arranged for others to act as couriers, security, or lookouts in an effort 
to avert law enforcement detection.365  On one occasion, at Blount’s direc-
tion, co-conspirators negotiated a drug deal with, and delivered heroin to, 
an individual who turned out to be an undercover officer.366 
Blount was charged with one count of conspiring to possess with in-
tent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; three counts of pos-
session of at least one kilogram of heroin with intent to distribute in viola-
tion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and three counts of unlawful use of a 
communication facility in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).367  Blount pled 
guilty to all counts.368 
Sentence Under the Guidelines:  
Blount was determined to have trafficked at least ten kilograms, but no 
more than thirty kilograms, of heroin.369  In addition, he exercised a leader-
ship role over at least one other participant in the conspiracy.370  Blount did 
accept responsibility.371  Blount’s past put him in criminal history category 
IV.372  In view of the above, the district court calculated Blount’s Guide-
lines range as 360 months to life.373  Blount was sentenced to 300 months of 
imprisonment for each of the conspiracy and possession with intent to dis-
tribute offenses, to run concurrently.374  In addition, Blount was sentenced 
to 96 months of imprisonment for each of the unlawful communication of-
fenses, also to run concurrently to each other and the 300-month terms.375 
Sentencing Under the Article’s Model: 
Offenses of Conviction: 21 U.S.C. § 846, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 
U.S.C. § 843(b). 
Grades of the Offenses: A (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)), E (21 U.S.C. 
§ 843(b)) 
Statutory Ranges: The statutory penalty for an A-class felony is life in 
prison.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) specifies, however, that the range for vio-
                                                          
 364.  Id. 
 365.  Id. 
 366.  Brief of the U.S. at 4, Blount, No. 14-1772 (7th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014).  
 367.  Indictment at 1–4, 10–11, 23, 25, 28–29, United States v. Blount, No. 11-CR-00415 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2011). 
 368.  Judgment at 1, Blount, No. 11-CR-00415 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2014). 
 369.  Brief of the U.S., supra note 366, at 5.  
 370.  Id. at 6.  
 371.  Id. at 8.  
 372.  See id. at 5–6. 
 373.  Id. at 8.  
 374.  Judgment, supra note 368, at 2. 
 375.  Id. 
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lations of the statute shall be 10 years to life.  The low-end of the range is 
10 years and the high-end of life, under this Article’s reference, to life ex-
pectancy means 61 years.376  The effective range, therefore, is 10–61 years, 
or 120 to 732 months.  The statutory penalty for an E-class felony is 1–5 
years.  21 U.S.C. § 843(b) specifies, however, that the statutory maximum 
penalty for a violation of this provision shall be no more than 4 years.  Ac-
cordingly, the applicable range is 1–4 years, or 24 or 48 months.  Assum-
ing, as with the actual sentence imposed, that the penalties are to run con-
currently for each count, and that the penalties are to run concurrently for 
each statute of conviction, the relevant statutory range is 120 to 732 
months. 
Midpoint of the Applicable Statutory Range: 426 months. 
25% Range: 373–479 months 
Counsel will invoke the limited universe of enumerated aggravating 
and mitigating factors to argue where, within this range, the sentence should 
fall, or to argue that the case is atypical and thus the sentence should fall 
outside of the specified range.  Here, the actual statutory range of 360 
months to life under the Guidelines is similar to the statutory range of 373–
479 months under the proposed model.  The heartland, in either case, would 
dictate a substantial sentence.  The high sentencing range should come as 
no surprise given Congress’s clear indication, reflected in the Class A felo-
ny ranking, that drug trafficking is a serious offense. 
B.  Adjustments to the Midpoint 
It bears emphasis that the final sentences imposed under the proposed 
model would be influenced by the parties’ arguments concerning any of the 
enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  With this important 
caveat in mind, the first two cases reveal sharp differences between the sen-
tences imposed under the Guidelines and sentences that would be within the 
range of typical under the proposed model.  For the third case, the proposed 
model arguably does a better job of getting closer to the below-Guidelines 
sentence imposed by the district court judge.  For the last case, the sentenc-
es seem to be close, at least prior to the point of the parties’ arguments. 
The key qualitative differences between the current system and the 
proposed one is not only that the starting point for the penalties would be 
the seriousness of the offense as determined by the will of Congress (as op-
posed to average past practice of the courts), but also the manner in which 
the sentence will be rehabilitative in nature (as opposed to punitive in na-
ture).  In other words, a simplistic appraisal of the proposed model—that is, 
it may arrive at roughly the same sentence as the current system—misses 
                                                          
 376.  See supra note 209.  
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the mark of how this system arrives at that sentence and how that sentence 
is to be carried out. 
The point of the four hypotheticals is to demonstrate that the system 
has these benefits—a principled source and a pragmatic method of execu-
tion—and also to demonstrate that the model may be applied with relative 
ease.  The statutory grade of the offense helps place the parties and the 
judge in the general ballpark of the sentence, and the sentence can be made 
proportional based on arguments made by the parties as to a fixed universe 
of factors. 
The Sentencing Guidelines were designed to be fluid, and the Sentenc-
ing Commission was designed to monitor developments and be responsible 
for the ultimate evolution of the Guidelines.  In the same spirit, the guide-
lines proposed herein are not static, but can be improved over time by the 
experts on the Commission. 
The original Commission understood that buy-in from the judges was 
critical to the success of any effort to regulate judicial discretion.377  Ac-
cordingly, the Commission grounded penalty levels in what judges already 
were doing.378  While this model does not anchor the midpoint of sentences 
to judicial past practice, the model nonetheless must be responsive to poten-
tial judicial reactions.  To minimize the gap between current sentences and 
a grade-based sentencing system, and to soften thereby any judicial hostility 
to this new system, the Commission should adjust the midpoint in consider-
ation of past practice.  For example, if the Commission studied sentencing 
data and determined that judges were imposing sentences well below the 
ranges proposed herein, the Commission could slash the midpoint, by mov-
ing it from the average of the applicable statutory minimum and maximum 
to a lower point between the statutory minimum and maximum.379  Doing 
so would bring this model’s sentences in closer alignment with current sen-
tences.  In short, this model is not only administrable, but also viable, as the 
Commission may adjust the relevant midpoint in consideration of judicial 
behavior. 
                                                          
 377.  See Paul H. Robinson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten Years Later, 91 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1231, 1241–42 (1997).  
 378.  See id. 
 379.  This authorization is consistent with what a sentencing expert once suggested in conver-
sation with the Author on how to improve the Guidelines: to include a chapter at the end of the 
Guidelines Manual that says, in effect, “divide the Guidelines range from the prior chapters by 
half.”   
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has likened the law to a pendulum.380  
This conception of the law is particularly apt in the context of federal sen-
tencing.  In 1984, Congress responded to unstructured sentencing and the 
consequent disparities by erecting a rigid guidelines system.  Twelve years 
after Booker, two things are clear: the status quo in federal sentencing is not 
sustainable, and that more than marginal adjustments to the Guidelines are 
in order.  This Article offers support for an alternative federal sentencing 
system that relies on factors and not figures, and that coordinates and gives 
meaning to each of the purposes of punishment, elevating the role of reha-
bilitation in sentencing and requiring release to be premised on offender 
readiness and not what a judge fixed as the release date perhaps years ago.  
This model, if adopted, would swing federal sentencing towards the simpli-
fied, reasoned, and just ends of the spectrum. 
                                                          
 380.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Remarks, C-SPAN (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?324177-1/discussion-supreme-court-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg (“The true sym-
bol of the United States is not the bald eagle, it is the pendulum.  When it swings too far one way, 
it’s going to go back in the other direction.”). 
